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1
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
The human heart is the first home of democracy
-Terry Tempest Williams (Nepo 2005: 231)

This inquiry explores leadership in education policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq.
It examines how the Iraqi Kurds, politically and socially marginalized within the greater
Middle East, remain steadfast in their orientation towards a better future. The Statement
of the Research Issue delineates policies and axial moments in Iraqi Kurdish history that
have inhibited appropriate education policy. It also speaks to events in Iraq that have
created new possibilities of being. The Background to the Research Issue expands and
elaborates on what has contributed to the Kurdish issue and provides requisite
information in understanding the historical context of the study. Finally, the Significance
of the Study offers how this research holds special importance for the University of
Salahaddin in Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq.
Statement of the Research Issue
Kurdistan lies in the strategic heart of the
Middle East (See Figure One). This position has
fomented tyranny, violence, and repression. Under
the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath
Party Kurdish students were threatened, coerced
and intimidated. They were denied legitimate
Figure One-Map of Kurdistan in Dark Gold
(Kurdistan Iraq outlined in fuchsia, oil fields in black)
in fuchsia)

academic achievement and were arbitrarily

imprisoned, tortured, and even executed. Many fled into Diaspora. In Diaspora they were
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forced to study in a foreign language. The collapse of the March 11, 1970 Peace Accord,
the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Anfal Campaign (1986-1989), and the quelling of the
1991 Kurdish uprising were cycles of violence and repression. The de facto independence
of the Kurdish Autonomous Region in 1991, the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional
Government in 1992, the deposition of Saddam Hussein and the banning of the Iraqi
Ba‟ath Party in 2003, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) of March 2004, the
democratic elections and Iraqi constitution of 2005, and the unification of the Kurdistan
Regional Government in 2006, have encouraged hope and imagination of a better future
for the Kurds. Specifically, the research issue addressed in this study is the inappropriate
education policies of Saddam Hussein Tikriti and the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party against the Kurds
of Iraq from 1968-2003.
Background to the Research Issue
Although the former dictator Saddam Hussein was executed on December 30, 2006
for killing 148 Shi‟a Arabs, and Ali Hassan Al-Majid, “Chemical Ali,” is awaiting
execution for his crimes against humanity in the Anfal campaign, justice has not been
served. Memories of the atrocities are fresh and the wounds remain unhealed. The
following brief overview of the Ba‟ath Party and its policies against the Kurds is a
compilation of general information from the Library of Congress Country Study “Iraq:
The Emergence of Saddam Husayn 1968-79,” the 1994 Human Rights Watch publication
“Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its Own Words,” the 1995 Human
Rights Watch/Middle East publication Iraq‟s Crime of Genocide, David McDowall‟s
2004 A Modern History of the Kurds, the International Center for Transitional Justice
January 22, 2008 briefing paper “Iraq‟s New „Accountability and Justice‟ Law,” and the
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Kurdistan Regional Government‟s website www.krg.org. The background events, rather
than being chronological in order, interweave and overlap.
The Ba’ath Arab Socialist Party
Al Ba’ath, Arabic for resurrection or renaissance, is formally the Ba‟ath Arab Socialist
Party and was founded in Damascus, Syria on April 7, 1947. A secular, largely
reactionary political movement, Ba‟athism combines Arab socialism, militarism,
nationalism, and pan-Arabism. Early Syrian Ba‟athists opposed European influence in
their country‟s affairs and sought a “rebirth” or “renaissance” of Arab nationalism.
Although the Party used the notion of unifying the Arab world as a platform and claimed
to speak for the entire Arab nation, it remained factional and relied on nationalist radicals
in the military. The Ba‟ath Party‟s motto of Wahdah, Hurriyah, and Ishtirrakiya,
translates as “Unity, Freedom, and Socialism.” Unity here refers to pan-Arab unity,
freedom emphasizes freedom from Western interests in particular, and socialism
specifically references Arab socialism. Kurds are not Arabs. They are a distinct ethnic
group with a distinct language and culture. They are democratic and continue to seek a
pluralistic, federal system within Iraq.
The Iraqi Ba’ath Party
The Iraqi branch of the Ba‟ath Party was established in 1954, first came to power in
February 1963, and then ruled Iraq from 1968 until 2003. An elaborate apparatus, the
Ba‟ath Party grew parallel to, and then later overtook, the normal institutions of the state.
Although the inner workings of the Party were secret and membership was originally
quite restricted, Ba‟ath Party officials were highly visible in their communities as
informants and enforcers of extra-judicial detentions and penalties. Rules for Ba‟ath Party
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membership were significantly relaxed in the 1990s as the regime sought to bolster its
stability. Membership is reported to have expanded greatly. An estimated 2.5 million
Iraqis were Ba‟ath Party members at the time of the 2003 liberation.
The De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society 2003-2008
On May 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority, under the direction of Paul
Bremer, began a de-Ba‟athification of Iraqi society. The initiative, which was based on
the de-Nazification of Germany after World War II, called for complete dissolution of the
Iraqi army, the intelligence services, and banned anyone who had been a member of the
higher tiers of the Party from government employment. Anarchy and violence ensued in
the power vacuum that followed. Much of the Sunni Arab insurgency plaguing Iraq was
thought to be centered on dismissed military men from the Ba‟athist regime. On January
12, 2008 a new legislation entitled the Accountability and Justice Law was approved. It
created a three month period for ex-members of the Ba‟ath to be challenged, after which
they would be immune from prosecution over the Saddam era. The law excluded former
members charged with crimes or still sought for them. However, it granted state pensions
to many former Ba‟athist employees even if they were not given new posts. As of this
writing the Accountability and Justice Law has not been fully implemented.
The March 11, 1970 Peace Accord and its Collapse
In March of 1970 the Iraqi Ba‟ath Revolutionary Command Council and Kurdish
leader Mustafa Barzani agreed to a fifteen-article peace plan. The plan theoretically gave
significant cultural, political, and economic rights to the Kurds. General Barzani was
allowed to retain his Kurdish Peshmerga troops and the Kurdistan Democratic Party was
granted official recognition as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish people.
However, the legal status of the Kurdish territory within Iraq remained unresolved. The
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agreement was never fully implemented and unraveled throughout the early 1970s. After
the March 1974 Ba‟ath attempt to assassinate General Barzani and his son Idris, full scale
fighting broke out. Saddam Hussein officially reneged on the peace accord in Algiers on
March 6, 1975 by signing an agreement with Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran.
The agreement with the Shah recognized the disputed boundaries of the Shatt al Arab
waterway, legalized the Shah‟s abrogation of the 1937 treaty in 1969, and dropped all
Iraqi claims to Iranian Khuzestan and to the islands at the foot of the Persian Gulf. In
return, the Shah agreed to prevent subversive elements (Kurds) from crossing the border,
ending Iranian assistance to the Kurds. Iraqi forces almost immediately defeated the
Peshmerga. Under an amnesty plan, about 70 percent of the Peshmerga surrendered to
the Iraqis. Some remained in the mountains of Kurdistan to continue the fight, and about
30,000 crossed the border to Iran to join the civilian Kurdish refugees, estimated to be
between 100,000 and 200,000.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)
The Iran-Iraq War, a protracted military conflict between the two nations, began on
September 22, 1980 with an Iraqi land and air invasion of western Iran. Saddam Hussein
reneged on the agreement with the then deposed Shah of Iran and claimed the attack was
again a territorial dispute over the Shatt al Arab waterway. Iranian leader Ruhollah
Khomeni declared that Iran would not cease fighting until Saddam‟s regime was
overthrown. Finally in July 1988, Iran was forced to accept a United Nations mandated
cease-fire. The estimated number of dead from the conflict ranges from 1 to 1.5 million.
Both sides held thousands of POWs for many years. Several prisoner exchanges and
releases occurred after 1988 with the final exchange taking place in 2003.
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The Anfal Campaign (1986-1989)
The Anfal campaign was an anti-Kurdish crusade led by the regime of Saddam Hussein
between 1986 and 1989. The campaign takes its name from Surat Al-Anfal, an Arabic
term for the eighth chapter of the Islamic holy Qur’an referring to “the spoils of war.”
The former Iraqi Ba‟athist regime, like Hitler‟s regime of Nazi Germany, used
euphemistic code words for its genocidal operation against the Kurds of southern
Kurdistan. According to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, the Anfal
campaign took an estimated 182,000 civilian Kurdish lives.
Ali Hassan Al-Majid, cousin to Saddam Hussein, was in charge of the operation. The
Anfal campaign included the use of firing squads, mass deportations, rockets fired from
helicopter gun ships, and chemical weapons. The Halabja poisonous gas attack of 1988,
considered part of Anfal, took an estimated 5,000 civilian lives, including those of babies
and children.
Arabization, another major element of Anfal, utilized heavy population redistribution.
Saddam Hussein‟s regime built public housing facilities in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as
part of Arabization. The redistribution promised poor Arabs from Iraq‟s southern regions
affordable housing in exchange for relocating to Kirkuk. Kurdish families were forced
from their homes. The Kurds view Arabization as a form of ethnic cleansing and see the
Arabs as a barrier to Kirkuk‟s recognition as a Kurdish city and a regional seat. Article
140 of the Iraqi constitution calls for a “normalization and census concluding with a
referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine the will of the people.”
This referendum to reverse the policy of Arabization was to take place by the end of
2007. On December 26, 2007 the Kurdistan National Assembly approved the UN‟s
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suggestion to delay the referendum for six months until the end of June 2008. As of this
writing negotiations are ongoing over provincial elections and Article 140 of the Iraqi
constitution has not been implemented.
The 1991 Kurdish Uprising
On March 6, 1991, during the course of the Gulf War, Kurdish citizens in Rania rose
up in revolt against the central government of Saddam Hussein. The uprising spread
rapidly throughout the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq. All the major Kurdish cities,
including the important oil center of Kirkuk, came under Kurdish control. Within three
weeks, however, Iraqi government troops returned and brutally crushed the revolt. Over
a million civilian Kurds fled across the mountains to neighboring Iran and Turkey. In the
ensuing fighting and refugee crisis, the United States and Britain established a “safe
haven” policed with a no-fly zone covering much of the Kurdish territory and forced the
Iraqi regime to establish a modus vivendi with the Kurds. Most of the Kurdish population
came down from the mountains and returned to their homes. A volatile relationship
between the Iraqi central government and the Kurds endured until the end of October
1991. The Iraqi troops, unable to assert central government control, withdrew
unilaterally from most of the Kurdish areas excluding the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.
The Kurdish Autonomous Region
The Kurdish Autonomous Region is the political entity established in 1970 following
the autonomy accord between Saddam Hussein and Mustafa Barzani. A legislative
assembly was established in the city of Erbil with theoretical authority over the Kurdish
populated provinces of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymania. In practice the assembly was
under the control of Saddam Hussein until the 1991 uprising against his rule. The
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Kurdish region thus gained de facto independence being ruled by the two principle
Kurdish parties; the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK). Elections held in June 1992 produced an inconclusive outcome with
the assembly divided almost equally between the two main parties and their allies. This
led to tensions, which ultimately sparked violence and the collapse of the autonomous
government. Heavy fighting broke out on several occasions: May 1994, September 1996,
and November 1997, killing thousands. Saddam Hussein reasserted some power through
assisting the KDP to capture Erbil in 1996. The region was essentially divided between
the KDP and the PUK.
The Kurdistan Regional Government
Since 1996 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been based in Erbil. The
KRG has a parliament and a cabinet. Mr. Nechervan Idris Barzani has been the prime
minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government since 1999. The president of the Region
is Mr. Massoud Barzani. The main Kurdish parties and the Peshmerga collaborated with
the coalition during the March 2003 invasion of Iraq that led to the demise of Saddam
Hussein. They subsequently came to be represented in the Iraqi Governing Council. On
January 30, 2005 the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) for the State of Iraq
recognized the autonomy of the Kurdistan Regional Government during the interim
between full sovereignty and the eventual adoption of a permanent constitution. The
KRG currently has constitutionally recognized authority over the provinces of Erbil,
Dohuk, and Sulaymania, as well as defacto authority over parts of Diyala, Ninawa, and
Kirkuk.
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The 2003 Liberation of Iraq and the 2005 Elections
The March 2003 fall of Saddam Hussein and his Ba‟athist regime is referred to as the
“Liberation of Iraq” by the Kurds. Following the liberation, democratic elections were
held on January 30, 2005. The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan won a
commanding majority in the Kurdistan National Assembly of the Iraqi Transitional
Government. This allowed Mr. Jalal Talabany of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, to be
elected the Iraqi Interim President on April 6, 2005. Kurdistan Regional Government
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, in a speech to the Kurdish Women‟s International
Conference held April 9-10 2005 in Stockholm, had the following to say of this axial
moment in Kurdish history:
Now we are in the beginning of a phase in which Kurdish and Kurdistani forces will have
direct responsibility for political decisions . . . In our delicate stage we should not forget
that we in Kurdistan will face major difficulties in the months to come with those
political forces coming to power for the first time. If we do not act consciously, if we do
not coordinate our efforts and if we do not ensure that our acts are backed by an
overwhelming majority of the people in Kurdistan, we might risk losing a greater part of
our gains. At this stage, we must encourage those democratic forces that support our
hard struggle not to forget us; not to ignore us in our urgent work; not to stop hearing us
when we raise our voice asking for their support; and not to close their eyes when they
see us fleeing. I am saying all this because we all have witnessed these kinds of acts in
our life time. The greatest dream of Kurdistan and the Kurds is not to witness similar
acts again. Our major task should be that we, together, in agreement, collectively and
with the support of democratic forces, reconstruct Kurdistan in a way we all should be
proud of.
The Iraqi Constitution of October 15, 2005
On October 28, 2005 Kurdistan Regional Government President Massoud Barzani
emphasized that Iraq‟s five million Kurds were in favor of the country‟s new constitution
and that “The people of Kurdistan are committed to the constitution as the guarantor of
the unity of Iraq.” He acknowledged that the charter did not meet all the aspirations of
the Kurdish people, namely their support for independence, but that the Kurds recognize
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the difference between what they wish and desire and what they can actually achieve. He
added, “This is why the Kurdish people support the constitution, which recognizes and
guarantees their hard-won autonomy.”
Unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government on May 7, 2006
The May 7, 2006 unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government was a landmark
victory for the Kurdish region. The second paragraph of the document reads as follows:
We must secure and guarantee the historic achievements of our people and the realization
of our full and just rights by putting in place and implementing the permanent
constitution, establishing a genuine federal and democratic Iraq; restoring Kirkuk,
Khanaqin, Sinjar, Makhmour, and other Arabized areas to the embrace of the Kurdistan
Region, and developing and growing the democratic experience in the Kurdistan Region
with further strengthening of stability and liberty through the creation of a lasting
unification of the Kurdistan Regional Government.
In January of 2008 the Kurdistan Regional Government announced that Nechervan
Idris Barzani would continue to serve as prime minister until the next election, which is
scheduled for 2010.
Significance of the Study
This study holds special significance for the University of Salahaddin in Erbil,
Kurdistan, Iraq as higher education there moves farther away from a centralized,
Arabized, tyrannical past, and moves closer to a federated, pluralistic, and democratic
future. It is the aim of this dissertation to reflect critical issues in higher education policy
development and to propose subsequent recommendations to be further evaluated by
Kurdish leaders in both government and education. Moreover, this research may provide
information and understanding requisite for other higher education policy development
and learning practices in this region of the world.
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Summary and Forthcoming
Chapter One provides the reader with a statement of the research issue; how violence,
tyranny, and repression have inhibited appropriate education policy in Kurdistan, Iraq. It
provides background to the research issue; how certain events and policies of the Iraqi
Ba‟ath Party were cycles of violence and repression against the Kurds. It also offers how
more recent events; the 2003 Liberation of Iraq, the democratic Iraqi elections and the
new Iraqi constitution have fostered hope and encouraged new ways of being for the
Kurds. The significance of the study is that it can provide a deeper understanding of the
context in which appropriate education policy could develop at the University of
Salahaddin. Forthcoming in this dissertation is Chapter Two; Three; Four; Five; Six;
Seven; Eight; and Nine. Chapter Two provides a background of Kurdistan. Chapter
Three covers a review of the literature. Chapter Four addresses the research process.
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven provide a presentation of the data. Chapter Eight provides
an analysis of the data. And finally, Chapter Nine offers a summary, findings,
implications, and personal reflections.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF KURDISTAN
Introduction
Chapter Two chronicles the modern history of Kurdistan and offers an overview of the
complex geopolitical, cultural and economic context within which the Kurds live in the
Middle East. Conflict has defined much of modern Kurdish history. At the end of World
War I the boundaries of new nations were drawn to suit European interests and neglected
local history, culture and traditions. Nationalist movements arose. Chapter Two presents:
Land and People, Language and Education, Religion, Economy, and The Kurds of Iraq
1919-1970. A summary concludes the chapter.
Land and People
The Kurdish homeland is a mountainous territory 230,000 to 300,000 square miles in
area south of the Caucasus Mountains. Equivalent to the size of France, it includes the
Anatolian plain, the jagged ridges of the Zagros Mountains, and the immense
Mesopotamian plain. Although the Kurds have inhabited the area for more than 4,000
years, they do not belong to a specifically designated Kurdish state. In 1514 Kurdistan
was divided between the Ottoman and Persian empires following the battle of Chaldiran.
At the end of World War I (1920-1923) Britain and France further altered the political
contour of the Middle East by dividing Ottoman Kurdistan among Turkey (43% of the
total area of Kurdistan), Iran (31%), Iraq (18%), Syria (6%), and the former Soviet Union
(2%). The Kurds in the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) passed
into that area when territories were ceded by Persia from 1807-1820 and by the Ottomans
in 1878 (Meho 2002: 3-4). Lennox (2001: 13) estimates the Kurds to number 19 million
in Turkey (28.4% of the population), 6.4 million in Iraq (24%), 9 million in Iran (12.6%)
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and 1.6 million in Syria (9.2%). The largest concentrations of Kurds outside of Kurdistan
are in the major cities of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the former Soviet republics; in two
Kurdish enclaves in central and north-central Anatolia in Turkey; in Khurasan in
northeast Iran, and in southern Turkmenistan (Meho 2001: 4). There are populations in
Russia, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. An estimated 200,000 Jewish Kurds live in
Israel. The Diaspora in Europe numbers from 1 to 1.5 million. The USA and Canada are
home to approximately 35,000 Kurds and Australia is home to some 12,000 Kurds
(Lennox 2001: 13). The Kurds comprise the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle
East after Arabs, Persians, and Turks (Meho 2001: 4).
Anthropologically, the Kurds are predominantly of Mediterranean ethnic stock,
resembling southern Europeans and the Levantines in skin, general coloring and
physiology. There is yet a persistent recurrence of two racial substrata: a darker
aboriginal Palaeo-Caucasian element, and more localized occurrence of blondism of the
Alpine type in the heartland of Kurdistan. Historically, Kurdish society has been tribal.
Accordingly, the loyalty of the Kurds is primarily directed towards the immediate family
clan; the cornerstone of the social system, and then to the tribe, the largest grouping
within Kurdish society. The cohesion of the Kurdish tribe is based on a mixture of blood
ties and territorial allegiances associated with strong religious loyalties. Many Kurds,
until recently, only occasionally showed loyalty to a nation, state, or any other entity.
This continues to be present today but it is in steady decline. The socio-economic and
political changes that most Kurds have witnessed since the 1960s such as the
mechanization of agriculture, industrialization, subsequent revolts, rural-urban migration,
emigration, political mobilization in party politics, the expansion of public education and
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mass communications, have weakened the tribal structure of Kurdish society and
provided an impetus for developing larger Kurdish nationalism (van Bruinessen 1992).
Language and Education
The Kurds speak various dialects of Kurdish that can be divided into two main groups.
The Kurmanji group, which is spoken by more than 75 percent of the Kurds and
composed of two major branches: Bahdinani (or North Kurmanji) the most widely
spoken dialect, and Sorani (or Central Kurmanji). The Pahlawani group, spoken by the
rest of the Kurds, is also composed of two major branches: Dimili (or Zaza or Hawrami)
and Gorani (or Kermshahi or South Kurmanji). All of these major dialects are further
divided into scores of sub-dialects yet all are members of the north-western division of
the Iranic branch of the Indo-European family of languages (Izady 1992: 172-182).
In their attempts to suppress Kurdish identity and revivalism, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and the former Soviet Union have used political and cultural oppression and economic
exploitation. The forms in which cultural oppression have been implemented vary. The
following are brief summaries of state policies towards the Kurdish language:
After the creation of modern Turkey in 1923, Ataturk decided to substitute the alphabet
used in Turkish from Arabic to Latin. Consequently, the Kurds of Turkey were forced to
do the same and adapt a modified version of the Latin characters to Kurdish. This
inhibited the exchange of literature between the Kurds in Turkey and Syria, and the
Kurds in Iran and Iraq. The Kurds in Iran and Iraq continued to use a modified version of
the Perso-Arabic alphabet. Less than a year later (1924), new measures were introduced
and implemented in Turkey with the aim of suppressing the Kurdish language. These
measures took the form of banning both the spoken and written use of Kurdish, and
ensuring that education and information were only provided in Turkish or to those people
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who spoke Turkish. Possession of written material in Kurdish became a crime
punishable by imprisonment. Turkish repressive measures against the use of the Kurdish
language have continued in varying degrees of severity; easing during civilian rule and
strengthening during military rule (Meho & Maglaughlin 2001:6). On March 8, 2006 the
Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council allowed two television channels and one
radio station to have limited service in the Kurdish language. This legislation came into
force as an effort to meet one of the European Union‟s requirements for its membership
talks with Turkey. Despite these reforms, however, the use of Kurdish in the public
sphere and government institutions is still severely restricted. Turkish remains the only
official language in Turkey and use of any other language as a first language is not
allowed in schools (www.nvtc.gov).
In Iran, speaking and writing in Kurdish were absolutely forbidden by law. Only in
the 1990s, due to pressure from Kurdish revolutionaries there, did the Kurds begin to
publish material in Kurdish more openly and use the language in many other cultural
activities. Kurdish literature and histories are available in Iran in both Kurdish and
Persian (Blau 2007).
In Iraq, the spoken use of Kurdish and the publication of Kurdish literature were
guaranteed by the 1932 Constitution. In 1958 the Kurdish language was officially
recognized as the second language of the country and was used and studied in schools
and universities (Kreyenbroek and Sperl 1992: 76). However, the Kurds struggled
against official animosity from the Iraqi regime on implementation of their constitutional
right to speak Kurdish from 1958 onwards until Article 9 of the TAL (Transitional
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Administrative Law) of March 8, 2004. Article 4 of the Iraqi constitution approved by
national referendum on October 15, 2005 states the following in reference to language:
First: The Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two official languages of
Iraq. The right of Iraqis to educate their children in their mother tongue, such as
Turcoman, Syriac, and Armenian shall be guaranteed in government educational
institutions in accordance with educational guidelines, or in any other language in private
educational institutions.
Second: The scope of the term “official language” and the means of applying the
provisions shall be defined by a law and shall include:
A. Publication of the Official Gazette, in two languages;
B. Speech, conversation, and expression in official domains, such as the Council of
Representatives, the Council of Ministers, courts, and official conferences, in either of the
two languages;
C. Recognition and publication of official documents and correspondence in the two
languages;
D. Opening schools that teach the two languages, in accordance with educational
guidelines;
E. Use of both languages in any matter enjoined by the principle of equality such as bank
notes, passports, and stamps.
Third: The federal and official institutions and agencies in the Kurdistan region shall use
both languages.
Fourth: The Turcoman language and the Syriac language are two other official languages
in the administrative units in which they constitute density of population.
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Fifth: Each region or governorate may adopt any other local language as an additional
official language if the majority of its population so decides in a general referendum.
This is the first time in Iraqi Kurdish history, with the implementation of Article 4,
that the constitutional right to speak Kurdish is being upheld.
In Syria, although 90 percent of the Kurds use Kurdish in their everyday life, the use
of the Kurdish language in any form is still against the law. Despite the greater tolerance
the Syrian government showed in the 1990s towards its Kurdish minority, the
government still prohibits the use of Kurdish in schools and forbids broadcasting and
publishing in the language (McDowall 1998).
In the former Soviet Union the Kurdish language was encouraged before World War
II. After the war, however, the assimilation processes carried out by the resettlement
campaigns of Stalin discontinued Kurdish as the medium of instruction in schools.
Cultural isolation of the Soviet Kurds from their brethren across the borders, a
consequence of changing the alphabet into Cyrillic, and the marginalized status of the
Kurds in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, have contributed to an ineffective
development of the Kurdish language in these areas (Meho & Maglaughlin 2001:7).
Religion
At least two thirds of the Kurds are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi‟is School of Law in
contrast to Arab and Turkish Sunnis who adhere mostly to the Hanafi School, and Azeris
and Persians who are Shi‟a Muslims (Van Bruinessen 1991:7). There are, however,
many Shi‟a Kurds concentrated in Kurdistan of Iran and in the districts of Khanaqin and
Mandali in Iraqi Kurdistan. Most of the remaining Kurds are adherents of heterodox,
syncretistic sects. Such sects include the Alevis (or the Qizilbash) with an estimate of
more than three million; the Ahl-i Haqq („People of Truth‟ or the Kaka‟is), and the
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Yezidis. There are also several thousand Christian Kurds and more than 150,000 Jewish
Kurds, most of who are residing today in Israel (Meho & Maglaughlin 2001: 8).
Until the mid-twentieth century, religion amongst the Kurds played a prominent role
in the Kurdish nationalist movement. Sheikhs led most of the Kurdish rebellions between
the 1880s and the 1930s. These rebellions were intensely influenced by the religious
diversity of the Kurds. The Sunnis, for example, were divided into tariqas or mystical
orders. The Naqshbandi and the Qadiri never cooperated effectively with each other in
any of the rebellions instigated by either side‟s leaders. The Shiite Kurds of Iran, on the
other hand, never took part in the Kurdish national movement. The Alevi Kurds, fearing
Sunni fanaticism, did not support the rebellion of Sheik Sa‟id in 1925; the Alevis,
conversely, received no support from Sunni Kurds in their rebellions of 1921 and 193738 (van Bruinessen 1991: 7-14).
Economy
Akram Jaff (2003) in his piece “The Fractured Economy of Kurdistan” describes
Kurdistan as being endowed with rich natural resources. Along with the minerals iron,
gold, copper, and petroleum, it has rich soils in its valleys, sufficient rainfall in most of its
territories, several permanently flowing rivers, a temperate climate, and skilled farmers
and herdsmen. The occupation of the majority of the Kurds is agriculture, which
therefore plays a crucial role in their economy. However, he says, Kurdistan‟s economy
is stagnant and its technologies static. Sound agricultural policies that benefit the Kurds
are not followed. The central planning administrations of the nation states of Turkey,
Iran, Iraq, and Syria have neglected development in the Kurdish areas. The following
statistics (Table Two) on the Kurdish economy are intended to show the distribution of
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resources amongst the four nation states. They are slightly different from the population
estimates of Lennox (2001: 13), yet population estimates vary on the Kurds due to
inaccurate census. The economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is much improved since the 2003
Liberation of Iraq, although statistics are not currently available.
Economic Statistics

Table Two Akram Jaff 2003 “The Fractured Economy of Kurdistan.”

The Kurds of Iraq 1919-1970
At the end of World War I Britain created the state of Iraq. Initially it was planned to
unite the two Arab provinces of Basra and Baghdad. This union would then lie within
British jurisdiction under the provisions of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. However,
oil was discovered in the predominantly Kurdish province of Mosul and Mosul was
occupied by the British in November 1918 (still under Ottoman jurisdiction) despite the
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Armistice of Mudros signed on October 31, 1918. Britain was aware that the population
of Mosul was mainly Kurdish. The British plan was to set up one or several semiautonomous Kurdish provinces to be loosely attached to the emerging state of Iraq. The
Kurds were against being included in Iraq. Eventually, they came into direct
confrontation with the British authorities (Chaliand 1993:143). From 1919 to the mid1940s, there was a long series of Kurdish rebellions against the British army and the Iraqi
regime for some form of real autonomy. All attempts by Sheik Mahmud Barzinji and the
Barzanis (Sheik Ahmad and Mullah Mustafa) failed. However, with the overthrow of the
British monarchy on July 14, 1958 by General Abd al-Karim Qassim, the Kurdish
national movement in Iraq re-emerged powerfully. General Qassim‟s coup de’ etat
raised Kurdish expectations for more equal participation in the state. Qassim welcomed
Mullah Mustafa Barzani back from exile and jointly they dealt with many mutual
enemies. Hoping to gain some civil and cultural rights for the Kurds, General Barzani
accepted to assist Qassim in his efforts to eliminate the government‟s opposition groups.
However, Qassim‟s regime disappointed Kurdish hopes and, eventually, the Kurdish
movement erupted again in 1961. Qassim failed to bring Barzani down and the war
between the latter and successive Iraqi governments continued until the March 11, 1970
Peace Accord between the Kurds and the Ba‟ath regime (McDowall 1996: 368-391).
Summary
Chapter Two provides background to the complex geopolitical, cultural and economic
context within which the Kurds live in the Middle East. The chapter examines: Land and
People, Language and Education, Religion, Economy and The Kurds of Iraq 1919-1970.
Chapter Three provides a review of the literature.
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CHAPTER III
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
This chapter provides a review of the literature in English, accomplished within the
context of the research categories Memory, Promise, and Imagination, that addresses
selected aspects of the challenges faced by Kurdish leaders in education policy
development in Kurdistan, Iraq. These aspects are reflected in the corresponding
subsections of: A History of Conflict, Education Policy, Economy and Development,
Diaspora, Human Rights Abuses, and Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Statehood. A
summary concludes the chapter.
Memory
In his piece on memory and forgetting Paul Ricoeur (1999:8) speaks of the difficulty
of preserving one‟s identity through time. This difficulty of identity preservation he sees
as having three components. The first component is that of dealing with change through
time. The second is the threat of the Other. Ricoeur believes that humiliations, real or
imaginary, are linked to this threat when this threat is felt as a wound which leaves scars.
The third component of preserving one‟s identity through time and preserving one‟s
selfhood in the face of the Other is the violence which Ricoeur sees as a permanent part
of human relationships and interactions. Most events that have to do with the founding of
any community, according to Ricoeur, are acts and events of violence. He states,
“Collective identity is thus rooted in founding events which are violent events. In a
sense, collective memory is a kind of storage of such violent blows, wounds and scars”
(1999:8). For the Kurds, these wounding events of memory have been made manifest
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through a history of conflict and domination, repressive education policies, and
entrenched underdevelopment.
A History of Conflict
David McDowall in A Modern History of the Kurds states, “With the Arab conquests
the Kurds emerged from historical obscurity, rapidly confirming the longevity of their
reputation for political dissidence” (2004: 21). The Kurds first came into contact with the
Arab armies in 637 with the latter‟s conquest of Mesopotamia. The Kurdish tribes had
been an important element in the Sassanian Empire and initially gave it strong support as
it tried to withstand the Muslim armies, between 639 and 644. Once it was clear the
empire was doomed, the Kurdish chiefs one by one submitted to the Arab armies and to
Islam. The pattern of nominal submission to central government, be it Persian, Arab or
subsequently Turkic, alongside the assertion of as much local independence as possible,
became an enduring theme in Kurdish political life. This history of conflict and
domination is chronicled by the following authors: Atarodi (2003), Fieldhouse (2002),
Ghareeb (2003), Izady (1992), Kreyenbroek & Sperl (1992), Meiselas (1997), and Yildiz
(2007).
Education Policy
Amir Hassanpour (1993) in Knowledge, Culture and Power: International
Perspectives on Literacy as Policy and Practice describes the struggle of the Kurdish
people to promote their national language and education while under the control of
hostile Ottoman, Arab, and Persian empires. With forced foreign-language education and
lack of political independence, the Kurds found it difficult to develop a literate tradition
in their native tongue. Hassanpour believes there is an intimate connection between state
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power and literacy in the process of gaining independence for a unified nation. In The
Non-Education of the Kurds: A Kurdish Perspective Hassanpour (1996) puts forth that
educational provision in Kurdistan violates most of the language-in-education
requirements of international law. He holds that the same is true for the Kurds in
Diaspora in most parts of the world. He believes that the future of Kurdish education
depends to a large extent on the political situation in the Middle East. And finally,
Hassanpour argues that only a democratic Kurdistan could promote education that fosters
nation building, self-determination, and autonomy. Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Sertac
Bucak (1994) in “Killing a Mother Tongue-How the Kurds are Deprived of Linguistic
Human Rights” show how a clarification of concepts, here demonstrated by the concept
of mother tongue, helps in analyzing lack of linguistic rights and in formulating the
requirements for a universal declaration of linguistic human rights. Robert Phillipson and
Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (1996) in “Colonial Language Legacies: The Prospects for
Kurdish” establish how the oppression of the Kurdish language is outstandingly severe,
and emphasize the importance of language rights for liberation. They also consider
whether the language policies of many states that were formerly colonies represent an
example to follow.
Economy and Development
A.C. Emmanuelsson (1995) in “Chasing the Rainbow: Economic and Social
Constraints Facing Kurdish National Aspirations in Iraq” contends that the Iraqi
government exploited the natural resources in and agricultural products of Kurdistan with
little benefit to the Kurdish people. He also states that forced migration and resettlements, with particular emphasis on the 1991 Gulf War, impeded economic
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development in Iraqi Kurdistan. Yosef Gotlieb (1991) in his doctoral dissertation Geoethnic Imperatives of Development: The Inter-Dynamics of Territory, Society and State
in the Third World advances the idea that entrenched underdevelopment in Kurdistan is
due to the social and spatial configuration of post-colonial states and that the colonies
were demarcated to further the economic and strategic interests of the metropolitan
powers. Accordingly, the indigenization of colonial space in the form of the postcolonial state perpetuates territorial incongruities between historical geo-ethnic regions
and formal borders. Gotlieb states that the historical and contemporary relationship of
the Kurds to Kurdistan exemplifies both the integrity of ethnicity and territory and the
disastrous consequences for development when this relationship is violated. He
concludes that the spatial realm of development activity should be defined by
anthropological and ecological continuities.
Gotlieb (1996) in Development, Environment, and Global Dysfunction: Toward
Sustainable Recovery argues that international growth oriented development is inevitably
accompanied by poverty, environmental degradation, and socio-political unrest and that
global priority must be re-ordered toward local development and sustainable
communities. In “Irreconcilable Planning: The Transformation of Life-place into
Economic Space in Iraqi and Turkish Kurdistan” Gotlieb (1997) advances the idea that
the violence found in Kurdistan is the outcome of two divergent views of the region. On
the one hand governments seek to rationalize and maximize the potential of Kurdish
areas as a resource frontier rich in soils, water and minerals. The official view of
Kurdistan is based on its uses as economic space in the service of the state as a whole.
For the Kurds, Gotlieb maintains, Kurdistan is life-place and represents the integrity of
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the society-nature relations prevalent in the region since time immemorial. Where the
state centers see modernization and aggregate economic growth as the primary objective
of their policies in all areas under their jurisdiction, the Kurds see economic exploitation
and cultural imperialism.
Promise
Paul Ricoeur (1999:13) states, “By acknowledging that the history of an event
involves a conflict of several interpretations and memories, we open up the future.” This
retrieval-projection of history has ethical and political implications. According to
Ricoeur, different political projects concerning the future invariably presuppose different
interpretations of the past. Utopian projects are about the unkept promises of the
historical past being re-projected and re-animated in terms of a better future, which might
realize such lost opportunities or unfulfilled, betrayed possibilities. Ricoeur believes it is
here that we connect past and future in an exchange between memory and expectation.
And that there is a permanent tension “between the space of experience and the horizon
of expectation” (Rheinhart Kosselek in Ricoeur 1999:13). According to Ricoeur this
critical exchange between memory and expectation is fundamental to the working
through of wounding events.
Ricoeur (1999: 9-10) speaks of Hanah Arendt (1992) in Chapter 5 of The Human
Condition entitled “Action” asking how it is possible that there be a continuation of
action in spite of death, in spite of the erosion of traces. Arendt brings together two
conditions for what she calls the “continuation of action;” forgiving and promising. To
forgive, according to Arendt, is to basically be liberated from the burden of the past, to be
untied or unbound, while promising enjoins the capacity to be bound by one‟s own word.
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Arendt argues that only a human being is capable of being unbound through forgiveness
and bound through promising. Unkept promises and betrayed possibilities of the Iraqi
Ba‟ath Party resulted in expulsion of the Kurds into Diaspora and human rights abuses.
Diaspora
Most of the literature on the Kurdish Diaspora primarily focuses on the difficulties
refugees encounter living in contemporary Europe, Canada, and the United States.
However, Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen (2000) in “Trans-state Loyalties and Politics of Turks
and Kurds in Western Europe” advances that diaspora activities influence politics in the
homeland and the host country. In so doing, these activities challenge the distinction
between domestic and foreign politics. Osten Wahlbeck (1998) in Transnationalism and
Diasporas: The Kurdish Example argues that the notions of transnationalism and diaspora
can provide sociology with some conceptual tools needed to study migrants in an
increasingly global world. The author believes that the sociology of migration has much
to gain from the contemporary diaspora discourse. It is argued that the traditional way of
looking at ethnic relations, in terms of a relation between strictly localized minorities and
majorities, is inadequate to describe refugees‟ experiences. The concept of diaspora
understood as a transnational social organization relating to both the country of origin
and the country of exile, can enhance understanding of the social reality in which
refugees live. Wahlbeck (1999) studies the diaspora communities in Britain and Finland
that Kurdish immigrants and refugees from Turkish and Iraqi violence have shaped. The
author considers the ways and degrees in which kinship and communal ties survive
violence. The study elucidates the emergence of transnational institutions and makes the
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theoretical case for replacing inadequate concepts of ethnicity with diaspora oriented
approaches. The next section focuses on human rights abuses.
Human Rights Abuses
The Human Rights Watch (1994) document Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi
Government in its Own Words was part of a wider effort by Middle East Watch to
provide evidence that the Anfal campaign by the government of Iraq against its
population of rural Kurds in 1988 amounted to genocide. At the time, Middle East
Watch was working toward bringing the case of genocide before the International Court
of Justice at The Hague. The documents were to constitute one important pillar of
evidence in such a case. Other evidence consisted of eyewitness testimonies collected by
Middle East Watch in Northern Iraq in 1992 and 1993, and forensic evidence obtained
there by Middle East Watch in collaboration with Physicians for Human Rights. Some
very important matches were made between documentary and testimonial evidence
especially in relation to Iraq‟s repeated use, in 1987-1988, of chemical weapons against
the Kurdish civilian population. The Human Rights Watch (1995) book Iraq‟s Crime of
Genocide combines findings from forensic missions (conducted jointly with Physicians
for Human rights), eyewitness accounts, extensive interviews, and the study of eighteen
metric tons of Iraqi state documents in arguing that the 1988 Anfal campaign against the
Kurds in northern Iraq constituted genocide. An international conference on genocide at
the Erbil Convention Center in Kurdistan, Iraq January 26-28, 2008 called on the Iraqi
government to recognize the crimes in the Anfal operation as genocide against the
Kurdish people. The crimes were identified as genocide in a directive issued on
September 12, 2008 by the Iraq Presidency Council. This decision comes months after
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the Iraqi Council of Representatives also unanimously voted on April 14, 2008 for a
resolution recognizing the crimes as genocide (www.krg.org). Prime Minister Barzani
addressed the conference in January 2008 and stated, “We must keep the memory of this
tragedy alive and protect the rights and dignity of the families. This progress should be
made without allowing hatred or violence in our actions or work.” He continued, “We
want to take these steps within our fine culture of tolerance, peace, and a hopeful life.”
Imagination
Ricoeur (1999:16) says that testimony is the ultimate link between imagination and
memory, because the witness says “I was part of the story. I was there.” At the same
time, the witness tells a story that is a living presentation and therefore deploys the
capacity of imagination to place events before our eyes, as if we were there. Testimony
then would be a way of bringing memory and imagination together. The role of “trust” is
paramount. When one testifies to something, they ask the other to believe what they are
saying is true. To share a testimony is an exchange of trust. Most institutions rely
fundamentally on the trust they place in the word of the other (Ricoeur 1999:15).
Ricoeur says that there is a “duty to remember” and that this duty is ethico-political as
it has to do with the construction of the future. He states:
. . . the duty to remember consists not only in having a deep concern for the past, but in
transmitting the meaning of past events to the next generation. The duty, therefore, is one
which concerns the future; it is an imperative directed towards the future, which is
exactly the opposite side of the traumatic character of the humiliations and wounds of
history. It is a duty thus to tell (1999:9).
The following is a review of the literature on the Kurdish struggle for autonomy,
sovereignty, and statehood.
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Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Statehood
The challenges Kurdish leadership face at present, many believe, can be attributed to
the Kurds not belonging to a designated Kurdish state. Massoud Barzani, descendent of
the Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani and current president of the Kurdistan
Regional Government, in Mustafa Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement (19311961) speaks on successive Iraqi regimes since the formation of the Iraqi state and the
perpetual suffering of all the Iraqi people. He states:
The Iraqis have suffered tremendous agony. They have never tasted true liberty and
independence. Historically, they have found themselves either ruled by a Turkish
Governor, a British Commissioner or a small band that leaped to power through a bloody
coup d’etat. They never elected a Parliament or a President freely, not even once. They
have never willingly pledged allegiance to a ruler. The Iraqis are a people whose
freedom has been usurped. However, their rulers have ruled in their name, killed in their
name, destroyed in their name, waged wars and compromised their sovereignty and
independence all in their name. The Iraqi people [has] never had the right to express [its]
opinion. All this happens while Iraq is being ruled by a political party claiming to be “the
bearer of the banner of unity, freedom, and socialism” and accusing its predecessors of
treason, dictatorship, and being agents [to foreigners] (2003:7).
The aforementioned book was published prior to the 2003 Liberation of Iraq.
Martin van Bruinessen (1992:10) in his doctoral dissertation Agha, Shaikh and State:
The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan puts forth that Kurdish nationalism and
tribal and religious loyalties stand in an ambivalent relationship to each other. On the one
hand, the first Kurdish nationalists were from the ranks of the traditional authorities;
shaikhs and aghas. It was, van Bruinessen maintains, precisely because of the primordial
loyalties to these leaders and to the values which they embodied that the nationalist
movement acquired its mass character. On the other hand, the perpetual conflicts and
rivalries between these traditional leaders prevented the Kurds from really uniting. This
dissertation was written in 1992.
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Gerard Chailand (1993: 11) in A People without a Country says in the introduction
that the Kurdish people have the unfortunate distinction of being probably the only
community of over 15 million persons which has not achieved some form of national
statehood, despite a struggle extending back over several decades.
Michael Gunter (1993) in “A de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq” and Gunter
(1992) in The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope chronicles the background of the
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq and devotes his analysis in both cases to the
uprising which followed the 1991 Gulf War. At that time he offered that despite
remaining difficulties there was now a reason to hope that the long nightmare of the
Kurds might be nearing an end.
Gina Lennox (2001) in Fire, Snow & Honey: Voices from Kurdistan asserts that
water is the future‟s elixir and far more essential that oil. She believes that as oil was to
the 20th century, water will be to the 21st, Kurdistan being rich in both. As well, overland
access to the oil-rich republics of the former Soviet Union is through Kurdistan. Lennox
states, “For these and other reasons of sovereignty and the strength of existing alliances,
neither the ruling nation states nor their international allies want a united, independent
Kurdistan, or a series of autonomous, federal states within present borders” (2001:13).
Abbas Vali (2003) in Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism believes that the
democratic doctrine of popular sovereignty is tied to the ethnic identity of the
dominant/majority group/nation in the nation-state; this excludes non-sovereign ethnic
and cultural identities from the democratic political process. The conceptions of
sovereignty and legitimacy entailed in democratic theory engender ethnic/national
conflict, statelessness, and opposition to the modern nation-state.
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Shafiq Qazzaz, Minister of Humanitarian Aid and Cooperation for the Kurdistan
Regional Government until May 2006 when he retired, and a research participant in this
study, wrote his doctoral dissertation at American University in 1971. Entitled
Nationalism and Cultural Pluralism: The Kurdish Case and timely today, he proposes that
there are two views from which the Kurdish problem must be considered. One is to see it
as a manifestation of a belated nationalism which concerns itself with the problem of a
divided people and territory, and the other would be to consider it a case of cultural
plurality with which the states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria must deal and solve in
order to eliminate a chronic source of instability and tension in Middle Eastern politics.
As a symbolic concept with common cultural characteristics, Kurdish nationalism is
reflected in the Kurds‟ demand for autonomy, with the immediate objective of winning
special recognition within each state. As an ideology which seeks national goals,
Kurdish nationalism is characterized by the demand of Kurdish independence. Within
this framework of locally as well as territorially promoted nationalist aspirations, the
limitations inherent in Kurdistan‟s fragmented status have always had a retarding effect
on the social transformation of Kurdish society and upon efforts to launch a unified
nationalist movement. Hence, organized Kurdish political efforts today range from the
pursuit of fully articulated political objectives within the framework of an active and
organized movement among the Kurds in Iraqi Kurdistan to the general lack of such
organized nationalist efforts among the Kurds in Turkey.
There are different ways of dealing with humiliating memories (Ricoeur 1999:9);
either we repeat them in the Freudian sense or we may try to extract the exemplarity of
the event rather than the factuality (for exemplarity is directed towards the future; it is a
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lesson to be told to following generations). So whereas the traumatic character of past
humiliations brings us back permanently towards the past, the exemplary dimension of
the same events is directed towards the future and regulated towards justice. It is the
power of justice to be just regarding victims, just also regarding victors, and just towards
new institutions by means of which we may prevent the same events from recurring in
the future. The mediating act of narrative opens the possibility of healing humiliating,
traumatic memories, but in addition, Ricoeur believes, we still need “a body count.” He
states, “You have to accurately count the corpses in the death camps as well as offering
vivid narrative accounts that people will remember” (1999: 15). Ricoeur says that it is
precisely through narratives that a certain education of memory has to start (1999:9).
Here we can introduce the connection between memory and forgetting in the construction
of plots, in the elaboration of narratives concerning personal identity or collective
identity. That we cannot tell a story without eliminating or dropping some important
event according to the kind of plot we intend to build.
Summary
Chapter Three offers a review of the literature in English that addresses challenges
faced by Kurdish leadership in education policy development in Iraq. The literature on a
history of conflict, repressive policies against Kurdish education, and entrenched
underdevelopment is reviewed in the Memory category. In the category of Promise
literature on the Kurdish Diaspora and human rights abuses is reviewed. The literature on
Kurdish autonomy, sovereignty and statehood is addressed in the Imagination category.
Chapter Four provides an account of the research process.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RESEARCH PROCESS
Introduction
This chapter is an account of my research process. I observed research protocol in the
participatory critical hermeneutic tradition as outlined in Herda (1999). This tradition
created the conditions to establish the research relationships and carry out the
conversations. In hermeneutical research Herda (1999: 86) states that “. . . language
takes the place of the perceptual world of objects, so that texts become the objects from
which human existence is indirectly understood or „read.‟” A text (discourse fixed by
writing [Ricoeur 1982: 143]) and social actions that are recorded (Herda 1990: 51) allow
us to recognize, challenge, and evaluate our worlds of action as well as envision new,
possible worlds. Participatory critical hermeneutic research is an interpretive and moral
act. I undertook this privileged endeavor with hope to “leap ahead of the Other [the Iraqi
Kurd] in his existential potentiality-for-Being . . . not in order to take away his „care‟ but
rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time” (Heidegger 1962:
159). The objective of this research, as stated in Chapter One, is to reflect critical issues
in education policy development and to offer subsequent recommendations for the
University of Salahaddin. Included in this chapter is the Theoretical Framework for the
Research Project, Research Categories and Research Questions, The Pilot Study, Entrée
to the Research Site, The Research Participants, The Data Collection Process, The Data
Analysis Process, The Background of the Researcher, and a Summary.
Theoretical Framework for the Research Project
In considering what the task of hermeneutical research is, Paul Ricoeur (1999: 43)
states that “. . . hermeneutics is the theory of the operations of understanding in their
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relation to the interpretation of texts. So the key idea will be the realization of discourse
as a text; and the elaboration of the categories of the text will be the concern of the
subsequent study.” This concept of text interpretation is the theoretical foundation for the
present study. The other grounding theories are: Geertz‟ Theory of Interpretive
Ethnography, the Ricoeurian Theory of Narrative Identity and Threefold Mimesis, the
Heideggerian Concept of Being as it Relates to Care/Solicitude and Language, and the
Habermasian Theory of Communicative Rationality.
Ricoeurian Theory of Text Interpretation
In his theory of text interpretation Paul Ricoeur advances that “the meaning of a text
lies not behind the text but in front of it” (1982:177). Ricoeur describes hermeneutics
(1982:112) “as the explication of being-in-the world displayed by the text. What is to be
interpreted in the text is a proposed world which I could inhabit and in which I could
project my ownmost possibilities.” Ricoeur‟s (1982:181) theory of interpretation places
emphasis on the “opening up of a world.” This theory of interpretation recognizes the
power of imagination, no longer the faculty of deriving “images” from our sensory
experience, but the capacity for letting new worlds shape our understanding of ourselves
with imagination treated as a dimension of language.
Geertz’ Theory of Interpretive Ethnography
In contrasting traditional ethnographic anthropological study with interpretive
ethnography Clifford Geertz sees the aim of anthropology as “the enlargement of the
universe of human discourse” (1973: 14). The importance of interpretive anthropology
goes beyond an objective way of viewing or looking at culturally distinct beings. It gives
us a way to converse “with” others and derive meaning from those culturally rich
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conversations. Geertz sees this discourse as having meaning that is not immediately
recognizable and hence needs interpretation. Geertz, in defining interpretive ethnography
or anthropological analysis, says it “is not a matter of methods” (1973: 6). What does
define it is “the kind of intellectual effort it is: an elaborate venture in „thick description‟”
(1973: 6).
Ricoeurian Theory of Narrative Identity
Paul Ricoeur (1992:3) suggests that the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such
an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other, that instead one passes
into the other. In considering appropriate education policy development in Iraqi
Kurdistan, Ricoeur‟s theory of narrative identity is reassuring. Ricoeur (1992:3) posits
that the nature of human beings is to embrace both a permanent and temporal aspect of
identity. These aspects of identity Ricoeur refers to as sameness (idem) and selfhood
(ipse). This dialectic of the self gives us a character, a set of lasting dispositions that
remains the same throughout transitions in our life and also allows us to create a newness
that houses the future (Herda 1999: 37).
Identity as sameness (idem) for the Kurds is reflected in their traditions, values, and
ideals. These traditions, norms, and values provide permanence; stability and identity
over time.

Kurdish identity as selfhood (ipse) is embodied in the variability,

discontinuity, and instability the Kurds have endured through protracted tyranny,
violence, and repression. Ricoeur‟s (1992: 119-121) theory of identity as selfhood (ipse)
provides a model of the interconnection of events constituted by emplotment allowing an
integration with permanence in time (idem) what seems to be contrary . . . namely
variability and discontinuity.
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Through narrative idem and ipse identity come together in what Ricouer refers to as the
“narrative unity of one‟s life.” In telling a story, the narrator connects disparate events in
a coherent plot, assigning meaning to events and experiences and creating a new world.
This act of emplotment draws together the sameness and selfhood of identity in a
meaningful way. When a narrator tells a story, he reflects on his history and tradition,
imagines and anticipates a future, and relates these to his present experience. This
threefold dimensionality is explored in Ricoeur‟s mimesis.
Ricoeurian Theory of Threefold Mimesis
Herda (1999: 76-77) instructs that mimesis refers to three domains: a past, a present
mediating act, and a future. Mimesis 1 creates the prefigured life, our traditions,
assumptions, goals, and motives, whereas mimesis 2 imitates the configured life. The
temporal dimension of the configured life, mimesis 2, is a mediating function. Ricoeur
(1984: 64-70) explains that mimesis 2 mediates between the world we already have come
to--already characterized by certain actions and cultural artifacts--and the world we can
imagine ourselves inhabiting. As described in Herda (1997a: 62) and applied to
organizations:
When we look at the already figured world, the take-for-granted world in mimesis 1 we
connect this to the new world we want to live in, mimesis 3, we see ourselves in different
capacities; we see a self enlarged by the appropriation of a proposed world which
interpretation unfolds. Here the organizational member (or the reader in literary terms)
makes his or her own that which was once foreign or alien. In this act, we have to
overcome cultural distance and historical alienation that separates us from the proposed
text-the proposed organization.
Mimesis1, the prefigured world, or the past-present, is the world of tradition, history,
and past experiences. Mimesis2, the configured world, or the present-present consists of
the way in which people make sense of their world based on their memories of the past
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and anticipation of the future. Mimesis3, the refigured world, or the future-present, is
where we imagine and anticipate a future that is coming towards us, a “kingdom of as if”
(Ricoeur 1984: 64). In realizing Ricoeur‟s “kingdom of as if,” Martin Heidegger
advances that our primordial existentiality of Being is that of Caring.
Heideggerian Concept of Being as It Relates to Care/Solicitude
One of the most important moves made in philosophy was Martin Heidegger‟s linking
the question of understanding not to another person, as Dilthey did, but to Being (Herda
1999:60-61). In Heidegger‟s concept of Being as it relates to care and solicitude he says
that in such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even
if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. In contrast to this, there is
also the possibility of a kind of solicitude that does not so much leap in for the Other as
leap ahead of him in his existential potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his
“care” but rather to give it back to him authentically, as such for the first time. This kind
of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care--that is, to the existence of the Other. . .
it helps the Other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it
(1962: 158-159). Through narration the Kurds may become transparent to themselves
and free for it on their path of existential potentiality-for-Being.
Heideggerian Concept of Being as It Relates to Language
Herda (1999: 61) writes that Being dwells in language and an individual senses being
through language. Heidegger (1971: 5) called “language . . . the house of Being . . . [and]
. . . man by virtue of his language dwells within the claim and call of Being.” The term
appropriation is used by Heidegger to describe the nature of the relationship between
person and being. A person belongs to language and is appropriated by language.
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Appropriation is the most simple and inconspicuous of phenomena in which mortals
spend their lives. Heidegger writes (1971: 128) “. . . appropriation grants to mortals their
abode within nature, so that they may be capable of being those who speak.” Further,
appropriation is a law, but not a law that is an ordinance or a norm hanging over our
heads telling us what to do, rather it is a “gentle law,” the law, “because it gathers mortals
into the appropriateness of their nature and there holds them” (1971: 128-129).
Specifically, (1971: 127) appropriation is “what brings all present and absent beings each
into their own, from where they show themselves in what they are, where they abide
according to their kind.”
Habermasian Theory of Communicative Rationality
The goal of communication is understanding, a coming to agreement. Jurgen
Habermas‟ (1984: xl) framework and foundation for a social theory is in the form of a
theory of action established through communication; specifically, communicative
competence. Communicative competence is a regulative ideal of communication, a guide
for interaction with others which calls from the future, not from the past. The starting
point of the theory is an orientation between a speaker and a hearer to reach mutual
understanding. Habermas‟ idea of a speaker and hearer reaching understanding, or
establishing communicative competence between hearer and speaker, relies on the use of
reason to attain intersubjective recognition for validity claims that can be criticized.
Habermas states:
A communicatively successful speech action requires, beyond the comprehensibility of
the linguistic expression, that the participants in communication be prepared to reach an
understanding, that they raise claims to truth, truthfulness, and rightness and reciprocally
impute their satisfaction (1979: 32).
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Paul Ricoeur‟s theories provide much of the theoretical foundation for this research.
Also the works of Clifford Geertz, Martin Heidegger, and Jurgen Habermas are
grounding to this study.
Research Categories and Research Questions
Category I: Memory
Ricoeur (1999) says that both memory and forgetting contribute in their respective
ways to what Hanah Arendt (1993) calls the “continuation of action.” For this
continuation of action it is necessary that we retain the traces of events, be reconciled
with the past, and divest ourselves of anger and hatred; justice being the horizon of both
processes. Ricoeur says the duty to remember is a duty to teach, whereas the duty to
forget is a duty to go beyond anger and hatred. Ricoeur urges that we must trust in
language as a weapon against violence, indeed the best weapon there is against violence
(1999: 17).
The following questions were designed to retain the traces of wounding events in
order to keep alive the memory of suffering:
What is the story of your education?
What influence did the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party have on your education?
How did Al-Anfal campaign influence your education or your family?
Category II: Promise
According to Ricoeur (1999) utopias are the places where we reactivate unkept
promises. By “not getting it right” in the past, we look to the future, to a utopia “to get it
right.” By remembering the unkept promises of the past and re-projecting them we can
imagine a better future. Ricoeur states:
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Utopian projects, for instance, are about the unkept promises of the historical past being
re-projected, reanimated in terms of a better future which might realize such lost
opportunities or unfulfilled, betrayed possibilities. So here we have to connect past and
future in an exchange between memory and expectation (1999: 13).
The following questions were designed to re-project and re-animate the unkept
promises of the past:
How did the Iran-Iraq War influence your education?
Where were you during the Kurdish uprising of 1991?
How did the Gulf War (1990-1991) influence your education?
If you left Kurdistan, please relate why and why you have returned.
Category III: Imagination
A hallmark of leaders is that they know communication or appropriation of the future
without carrying the “baggage.” They move through successive interpretations. Through
the hermeneutic circle of anticipation, reflection, narrative, conversation, interpretation,
understanding, and appropriation leaders open possibilities for the future by what is
remembered and imagined in the present. The following questions were designed to
imagine in the present:
What influence has the 2003 Iraq War had on education policy in Iraqi
Kurdistan?
What influence have the Iraqi elections of 2005 and the Iraqi constitution of
October 15, 2005 had on education policy in Iraqi Kurdistan?
How would you imagine education policy in the Kurdistan utopia of your
dreams?
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The Pilot Study (Fall 2003)
In spring 2003, in the lead-up to the Iraq War, I was enrolled in the University of San
Francisco course Legitimation of Power in Society and Organizations. I remember
commenting to Dan Mehring, a colleague in the course, that Saddam Hussein had been an
illegitimate leader for a very long time. At Grace Episcopal Church in March of 2003 our
priest, Father William McIlmoyl, solicited individual prayers written on paper from the
congregation He then read them aloud to help us pray as one body. Most prayers read
something like “I pray for peace and that our troops come home safely.” My prayer read
a little differently. I prayed for the “effective dismantling of the Ba‟athist security web in
Iraq.” This would be telling of my selecting the Kurds of Iraq as my topic in Advanced
Anthropological Research in the fall of 2003.
By way of the Kurdish Information Network and Kani Zulam, I was referred to a halfKurdish, half- British American, Cyrus S. for his possible participation in my pilot study.
My hope was to gain historical and political footing on the subject of legitimate Kurdish
leadership in my conversation with Cyrus. I had been overwhelmed by the deluge of
literature on the Kurds at the University of California Berkeley library in at least eight
different languages. My fascinating and informative conversation with Cyrus, over hot
tea in tall glasses in his Berkeley apartment, wonderfully exceeded my expectations. In
many significant ways his words have informed my journey and defined my path.
My topic changed in the summer of 2004. Indepth reading of Ricoeur gave me
perspective on research and learning which led to my focus on education policy
development. The data I chose from the pilot study are different than what I had
originally planned. In my conversation with Cyrus he related a traumatic, wounding
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event his Kurdish cousin experienced when she returned to her home following the
Kurdish uprising of 1991. He related:
My cousin lived near a security agency in downtown Sulaymania. When the uprising
happened in 1991, the Ba‟ath were four houses away from my cousin‟s house. My cousin
comes from a very old, genteel, beautiful family; very well educated. The Ba‟ath came
and told them „You have got to leave. Don‟t take anything. Just leave.‟ And so they left.
The uprising happened and they went back. And what happened was the Ba‟ath knew
they were in trouble so they pretended to be locals. They moved into my cousin‟s house,
put on her family‟s clothes and tried to look like they were Kurdish. The Peshmerga
easily pegged them to be local elite Ba‟athists. They threw grenades in and the Ba‟athists
were blown to pieces. When my cousin and her family came home there were body parts
all over the house. She hadn‟t told me this for ten years. When you meet people who
have lived in circumstances like these they can be so matter of fact . . . they‟re like „this is
normal.‟
The research categories Memory, Promise, and Imagination derive from such
wounding events stored in the collective memory of the Iraqi Kurds. Ricoeur (1999: 9)
suggests that the “exemplary dimension” of such events is directed towards the future and
regulated towards justice. And that it is the power of justice by means of which we may
prevent the same events from recurring in the future.
Entrée to the Research Site
My hope in the fall of 2004 was to find a way to travel to Iraqi Kurdistan. I attended
the conference “Kurdish Human Rights: Statelessness, Resistance and Survival”
September 4_5 in San Francisco. The Social and Cultural Anthropology Program at the
California Institute of Integral Studies hosted the event. It was there that I met Ms. Tara
Aziz. At that time she was program officer for the Washington Kurdish Institute. I was
touched by her presentation and was drawn to her authenticity. I asked her if I might
possibly go to Iraqi Kurdistan. She replied, “Why not?” I asked her if I could go now
and she said, “This is the best time to go.” She asked me to send her my resume and a
letter of intent as she knew someone in Iraqi Kurdistan. Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir of the
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Kurdistan Regional Government extended me an invitation and three weeks later, on the
first day of Ramadan October 15, 2004, I arrived at the Chwar Chra Hotel in Erbil,
Kurdistan, Iraq. I spent three months there collecting data.
The Research Participants
I returned from Iraqi Kurdistan on January 12, 2005 for spring semester at USF. Then
on June 28, 2005 I traveled to Washington, D.C. for further data collection. I had also
met Ms. Soraya Serajeddini (passed away on June 24, 2006) at the Kurdish Human
Rights conference in San Francisco in 2004. Her presentation “Iraq Drama: Good ShiiteBad Shiite, Kurds Lose Again” deeply interested me. She was very active in Kurdish
politics and was residing in the metropolitan Washington area. Also in the D.C. area was
Mr. Nijyar Shemdin, who I had met at the Sheraton Hotel in Erbil while recording Dr.
Mohammad Ihsan. In Washington, D.C. I attended two conferences; the Kurdish
National Congress of North America‟s “Kurdish Quest for Independence and Prospects
for Statehood” March 17-19, 2006 at the D.C. North Hilton and the Kurdish American
Committee for Democracy in Iran‟s “Road to Democracy---Full Political and Human
Rights in Iran” at the Russell Senate Office Building May 30, 2006. At these two events I
met Mr. Qubad Talabany, Dr. Kamal Artin, Mr. Tom Ver Ploeg, and Dr. Pary Karadaghi.
I recorded Ms. Soraya Serajeddini on June 11, 2006 in College Park, Maryland. I spoke
with Mr. Nijyar Shemdin in his office in McLean, Virginia on August 28, 2006. Dr. Pary
Karadaghi I recorded in her Fairfax, Virginia office on April 4, 2007 and Mr. Qubad
Talabany in his office in Washington, D.C. on April 13, 2007. The remaining eight
participants were recorded in Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq in late 2004 and early 2005. All
twelve participants have bachelor‟s degree; three have master‟s degrees and seven have
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doctorates. The following chart gives a brief profile of the research participants (See
Appendix E pages 130-134 for photographs).
Name

Title

Organization

Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir Minister of State (original)
Born: 1964 in Erbil,
Kurdistan, Iraq
Director of Foreign
Relations (current)

Kurdistan Regional Government

Mr. Safeen Dizayee
Born: 1963 in Erbil,
Kurdistan, Iraq

Director of External
Relations

Kurdistan Democratic Party

Dr. Susan Hussain
Born: 1965 in Erbil,
Kurdistan, Iraq

Professor

University of Salahaddin

Dr. Mohammad Ihsan
Born: 1965 in Zakho,
Kurdistan, Iraq

Minister of Human Rights Kurdistan Regional Government
(original)

Minister of External Affairs (current)

Dr. Pary Karadaghi
Director
Born: 1959 in Sulaymania,
Kurdistan, Iraq

Kurdish Human Rights Watch

Dr. Kafia Mawloud
Born: 1954 in Erbil,
Kurdistan, Iraq
Dr. Narin Mayiwar
Born: 1971 in Aqra,
Kurdistan, Iraq

Dean of Nursing College

University of Salahaddin

Professor

University of Salahaddin

Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz
Minister of Humanitarian
Kurdistan Regional Government
Born: 1934 in Sulaymania, Aid and Cooperation (original)
Kurdistan, Iraq
Retired (current)
Dr. Mohammad Sadik
Born: 1955 near Erbil,
Kurdistan, Iraq

President

Ms. Soraya Serajeddini Vice President
Born: 1960 in Tehran, Iran
Died: July 24, 2006 in the USA

University of Salahaddin

Kurdish National Congress of
North America
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Mr. Nijyar H. Shemdin
Born: 1938 in Zakho,
Kurdistan, Iraq

Representative to the
UN/USA/Canada (original)
CEO (current)

Kurdistan Regional Government

Mr. Qubad Talabany
Born: 1977 in exile in
the Middle East

Representative to the
USA

Kurdistan Regional Government

Middle East Corporation for
Reconstruction and Investment

The Data Collection Process
The data were collected through conversations that were recorded and transcribed. The
transcribing, typing, and editing of the conversations were completed from July 2006 to
July 2007. As the texts became available, they were sent via email to the participants for
their approval. Mr. Tom Ver Ploeg and Dr. Kamal Artin read and commented on the
transcription of the conversation with the late Ms. Soraya Serajeddini (See Appendices
A-D on pages 124-129 for IRBPHS forms).
The Data Analysis Process
Ricoeur (1982: 53) stresses in the non-ostensive act of analysis that the text “must be
unfolded, no longer towards its author, but towards its imminent sense and towards the
world which it opens up and discloses.” The conversations generated two hundred and
fifty five pages of data. The original categories of Memory, Promise, and Imagination
were maintained. The data and an initial analysis are presented in Chapters Five, Six, and
Seven. The problem is discussed at the theoretical level in Chapter Eight. Implications of
the research and suggestions for further study are made in Chapter Nine. Examples of the
learning experience and “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer 1976: xxi) are also offered along
with how the study is related to me and what role it played in my life.
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Background of the Researcher
Herda (1999: 9) states that “Critical hermeneutic participatory research is not
described as a revolutionary position; rather it is a position to which one is summoned.” I
was summoned to this particular project by my experience with the Syrian Ba‟ath Party.
When I was teaching English as a Foreign Language for the United States Information
Agency in Damascus, Syria, 1987 to1989, a student of mine, Al-Khayam Al-Hemsch,
was imprisoned for three hundred and seventy two days by the Syrian Ba‟ath for having
had a friendship with me, an American. I was interrogated twice by Syrian intelligence
liaisons, once in the infamous Mazzeh prison. I was refused a travel visa to Turkey. AlKhayam was tortured and remained in prison until two days after I left the country. I
have personal, first hand experience with the tyranny of the Syrian Ba‟ath Party. The
horizon of this study is justice, however, not revenge.
As part of my undergraduate work in Spanish and Latin American Studies at The
Evergreen State College 1974-1979, I completed a three month ethnographic study of the
Zapotec Indians of Teotitlan del Valle, Mexico. I also worked as a Health and Nutrition
Educator in integrated rural development as a United States Peace Corps Volunteer in
Longavi, Chile from 1980-1982. I earned my master‟s degree in College Instruction with
an interdisciplinary emphasis in Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages in
1987. As part of my twelve year work in TESOL I was project coordinator for a United
States Information Agency College and University Partnership Program grant between
the University of Maryland and Samara State Pedagogical University in Samara, Russia. I
spent fall semester 1994 and fall semester 1995 at Samara State Pedagogical University
collaboratively writing an English language teaching text book for Russian university
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students. I also worked for the United States Department of Commerce as a bilingual
supervisor for Census 2000.
Summary
This chapter addresses the research process carried out within the critical hermeneutic
tradition. It provides the Theoretical Framework for the Project, The Research
Categories and Research Questions, The Pilot Study, The Entrée to the Research Site,
The Research Participants, The Data Collection Process, The Data Analysis Process, and
the Background of the Researcher. It offers that through narrative and conversation the
researcher learned of the wounding events that scar the collective memory of the Kurds
and that through analysis hopes to “leap ahead of the Other in his existential potentialityfor-being . . . and give his care back to him authentically as such for the first time”
(Heidegger 1962). Chapter Five presents the data within the category of Memory and an
initial analysis.
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CHAPTER V
MEMORY
The soul empties itself of all its own contents in order to receive into itself the being
it is looking at, just as he is, in all his truth-Simone Weil (Noddings 1992: 15-16).
Introduction
The previous chapter of this document introduces the theoretical framework for the
study, the research participants, and provides the guiding questions and research
categories for the conversations. This chapter presents the narrative the data depicts
within the category of Memory. The data presentation includes the subsections
Memories of the Iraqi Ba‟ath and Education; Only Those Who Signed for the Ba‟ath
Were Privileged and Promoted, and Wounding Events; Arabization and the Anfal
Campaign. A summary concludes the chapter.
The central question of the inquiry “What is the story of your education?” answered in
light of the rule of the Iraqi Ba‟ath, divided the participants into three sets. The first set,
Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz and Mr. Nijyar Shemdin, did not attend school or university under the
rule of the Iraqi Ba‟ath. During the reign of the monarchy they both attended Baghdad
College, an American Jesuit preparatory high school affiliated with Boston College. Dr.
Qazzaz received his B.A. in Economics from the University of Baghdad in 1960, his
M.A. in Diplomacy and International Economics from the University of Kentucky and in
1971 received his Ph.D. in International Studies from American University. From 1965
to 1973 he was the representative of Mullah Mustafa Barzani‟s September Revolution in
the United States. Mr. Nijyar Shemdin graduated from Baghdad College, the Jesuit high
school, in 1955. At the end of 1955 he went to Roberts College in Istanbul and studied
there for three years until 1958. Abd al-Karim Qasim‟s coup de’ etat in Iraq in 1958
interrupted Mr. Shemdin‟s education. In 1964 he graduated from the Jesuit university in
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Baghdad, Al-Hikma, with a BAC in Business Administration. He later received his MBA
from the American University of Beirut.
The second set of research participants were either born in exile or were primarily
educated in Diaspora. Their stories mostly appear in the category of Promise. They
include Mr. Safeen Dizayee, Dr. Pary Karadaghi, Ms. Narin Mayiwar, Ms. Soraya
Serajeddini, and Mr. Qubad Talabany.
The third set of research participants attended school, university, or taught during the
rule of the Ba‟ath Party in Iraq. They include Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir, Dr. Susan
Hussain, Dr. Mohammad Ihsan, Dr. Kafia Mawloud, and Dr. Mohammad Sadik.
Memories of the Iraqi Ba’ath and Education
In Time and Narrative v 3, Paul Ricoeur (1988: 109-113) speaks of the succession of
generations and believes that predecessors, contemporaries, and successors provide an
answer by designating the chain of historical agents as living people who come to take
the place of dead people. This succession underlies historical continuity and the rhythm
of tradition and innovation. Ricoeur says that the “very relation of contemporaneity” is a
mediating structure between the private time of individual fate and the public time of
history. The following is the story of my research, the narrative of the conversations I
had, in which I learned of the wounding events that scar the collective memory of the
Iraqi Kurd. All the conversations were in English. At times I correct grammar or syntax
for clarification, yet primarily use the words of the participants.
I had been in Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq for three weeks when I visited the office of Mr.
Falah Mustafa Bakir as Minister of State, Office of the Prime Minister, for the Kurdistan
Regional Government. It being Ramadan, his assistant, Ms. Souham Mamand, gracefully
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wore a dark gold head scarf which complemented her modern, tailored Western clothing.
She greeted me warmly and was surprised I had been in Erbil for so long. Hers was the
first memory I heard of the influence the Iraqi Ba‟ath had on Kurdish education. She told
me how the Ba‟ath Party had come to her school when she was in the sixth grade and
asked her to report unfavorably on her neighbors. She refused their request. They said,
“Well, then we will take your father.” They imprisoned her father several times and
subsequently she wasn‟t allowed to graduate from the sixth grade. I tried to imagine this
happening at my elementary school, River Road Elementary, in Eugene, Oregon in the
mid 1960s. It was impossible to imagine. I felt deep shame as an American and as a
human being that no one had stepped in to shield and protect the education of this
innocent girl. I was assured that traveling to Iraqi Kurdistan, to listen to the story of the
Iraqi Kurd, was of vital importance. When I spoke with Dr. Susan Hussain, professor of
French and English Literature at the University of Salahaddin, she said she thought that
each Kurdish family had such “a miserable and tragic story.”
Only Those Who Signed for the Ba’ath Were Privileged and Promoted
I spoke with Dr. Hussain in my suite at the Chwar Chra Hotel in Erbil. The name
“Chwar Chra” or “four lamps” holds special significance for the Kurds. In Kurdistan
Iran, following the establishment of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946, General Mustafa
Barzani and the Peshmerga captured President Qadi Mohammad. Mohammad, along with
four others, was hung at the intersection where four roads meet named “Chwar Chra.”
This intersection has become a symbol of the Kurdish struggle for independence. Two of
Dr. Susan Hussain‟s brothers were also Peshmerga. She recalls, as the youngest at home,
that although her older brothers and sisters were very intelligent “it was only those who
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signed for the Ba‟ath Party who were privileged and promoted.” She said, “This was the
beginning, I saw that there was injustice. Later it became even worse.”
There was a Kurdish student in Dr. Hussain‟s class who had signed for the Ba‟ath in
order to protect her family. Her father was in prison. Dr. Hussain commented, “It was
their, let‟s say, „rule.‟ Someone in a family did something and then all the others were
condemned. Whole families would disappear, even little children. This was their
policy.” In the same class they were obligated to elect a student to represent the Party.
The day of the election Dr. Hussain decided not to vote and submitted a blank ballot. She
said, “It was a disaster later on.” After the election she was called into the office of the
headmaster. He asked “Do you know what you are doing?” She wondered how they
knew she hadn‟t voted. It was supposed to be a secret ballot. They began to threaten her
saying that she and her family were going to be punished. She said, “After that I was the
black sheep at school. Although I was the best student, little by little they began to
punish me by my marks. You know, giving me low marks and so on.” The giving of low
marks to Kurdish students who excelled, but who wouldn‟t join the Party, was the norm
under the Iraqi Ba‟ath. Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir was also punished during his years at
the University of Mosul for being Kurdish and for not joining the Party.
I first saw Mr. Falah Mustafa, now Director of the Office of Foreign Relations for
the Kurdistan Regional Government, on television in the lobby of the Chwar Chra Hotel.
He was being broadcast on the Kurdish network from in front of the Whitehouse in
Washington, D.C. When I spoke with him later in his Erbil office he told me about
several points in his education where the Ba‟ath had prevented him from progressing. In
his secondary school the Ba‟ath came and imposed on people that they become Party
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members. He said that he managed to avoid the Ba‟ath until he went to the university.
He was admitted in 1982 to the University of Mosul, College of Arts; English Language
Department. He related a story to me. One day in the afternoon, after office hours, he was
wearing a Kurdish outfit. He and some friends had been picnicking and had come back.
They were sitting in the garden of the university. A Ba‟ath security agent approached
them. Mr. Falah thought the Muhabarat liked the Kurdish dress he wore and thought that
the agent wanted to take a photograph with him. Instead, the Ba‟ath asked for his I.D. in a
very impolite way. Mr. Falah said the Ba‟ath were “never polite in dealing with people.”
That in the security checkpoints and everywhere in the university they spoke “in a very
tough, rude language.” He said, “The Ba‟ath were arrogant and felt that they were
superior to others. This gave me a feeling of inferiority.”
Mr. Falah took out his I.D. and gave it to the Muhabarat. It was university student
I.D. The Muhabarat said, “You are not allowed to wear this.” Mr. Falah replied, “Well, I
am not in the class and this is normal and everybody wears it.” I asked Mr. Falah if it
was a rule that Kurdish dress was not allowed. He replied, “No, it was just what was in
his thoughts. It was arbitrary, based on his temperament.” He went on to say that the
Ba‟ath security agent had the power to arrest him, that he was authorized to do anything,
and that “this was the security and the Muhabarat in the regime of the Ba‟ath.”
Mr. Falah‟s dream was to become a successful English language teacher. He had
Indian and Pakistani lecturers in the first and second year of the university. One lecturer
he described as being “very honest and faithful.” This particular lecturer told Mr. Falah
that they [the teachers] had to give him lower marks, even though he was doing very
well. The lecturer said that they had to give him marks lower than the two ladies who
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were Iraqi Ba‟ath Party officers‟ daughters.

The following is an excerpt from the

conversation:
FMB: He said he could give me lower marks, but he could not give me higher marks.
Even though I was doing very well in the exams, in class participation, and in everything,
they were not able to give me more. The exception was the course in Arab Ba‟ath Party
ideology; the national education about Saddam and his Party. In that course, on that
subject, they gave me the lowest marks that I had. In the rest, I had excellent or very
good. The least mark that I had was very good. But they gave me medium or average, or
just pass.
JJ: So what you are saying is they couldn‟t give you as high as what you had really
earned . . .
FMB: They were told. The teaching staff was told that they should not give me higher
marks than these two ladies [Ba‟ath Party officers‟ daughters].
JJ: So, no matter what you did . . .
FMB: So, no matter what I wrote . . .
JJ: It [your grade] always had to be lower . . .
FMB: Indeed I had cases, for example, in the first semester, when I had thirty seven out
of forty in drama. That was the highest mark in the class. The teacher told me, in a very
rude way, „If you don‟t take care of yourself, you will fail.‟
JJ: If you don‟t take care of yourself you will fail?
FMB: Yes.
JJ: You mean if you don‟t start doing poorly . . . if you don‟t watch it you are going to
fail?
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FMB: Yes.
This was very unfair. I thought about my values in education and how angry I would
be with such treatment. Mr. Falah said the teacher was a Ba‟ath Party member, a high
ranking official. That he was unable to speak English and that he did not write his own
dissertation. That he had paid someone to write it for him. Mr. Falah noted, “His name
was Azhat. He was incapable. He was immoral. He was impolite and he talked in
Arabic, the Muslari dialect, in class.”
The most unfortunate, according to Mr. Falah, was when he reached the final stage of
the fourth year in the university. It was during the Iran-Iraq War. He remembers they
had a Christian lecturer. The lecturer approached him and said, “Look Falah, I need your
benefit. I need your future. You are a very good student. You are very clever. Come
and join the Ba‟ath Party.” Mr. Falah said that the Ba‟ath would come every week and
ask him to join. He said that they wanted to get the top students in the class; that they
wanted to attract the best people to be Ba‟ath Party members. The Christian lecturer told
Mr. Falah:
Look, Falah, it will be for your benefit if you join. If you sign for the Ba‟ath Party, then
you will not be sent to the front. You will not serve in the army for five or six years. You
will just go there for six months and then you will come and join your studies. Your heart
will not be with them. But it will be for your benefit.
He told the Christian lecturer, “Even if I go to Erbil, to Sheik Halawi, and sell
cucumbers and tomatoes with my degree in my pocket, I will not join the Ba‟ath Party.”
He later did join the army in hopes of pursuing a graduate degree. His average during his
studies in English Language and Literature from the University of Mosul was 82.61%.
But when he submitted his papers he did not meet the requirements. The requirements
were to be a Ba‟ath Party member . . . to have donated jewelry for Saddam‟s codicil . . .
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to have followed Saddam‟s ideology . . . He told me, “I will never, ever forget that. I felt
nothing was right in this country. Everything was based on unfairness and injustice.”
Then he said to me, “Indeed I am very proud and very fortunate that I was able to
continue and to take up the challenge until 1994, when I was able to get my master‟s
degree in the UK.” The Kurdistan Democratic Party leadership supported him to apply
for an achievement scholarship. He received his master‟s degree from the University of
Bath in Development Studies with a focus on the Third World. His thesis was on the
Kurdish movement in Iraq and world politics. “Taking up the challenge” in Mr. Falah
Mustafa Bakir‟ words, is reminiscent of a knight taking up the gauntlet for a noble cause.
This serves as a metaphor for the Kurdish struggle to receive a just education under the
Iraqi Ba‟ath Party.
Wounding Events
Dr. Susan Hussain was also a top student at the University of Mosul. In her second
year, during the war against Iran, she and a group of Kurdish students protested fighting
as Jaysheshabee. Jaysheshabee was supposed to be a volunteer civilian army, but the
students were forced to join. The protest was during the examinations at the end of the
year. Because they protested, they lost the whole year and had to repeat it. Dr.
Mohammad Ihsan was with her in the same group. He had told me about the Muhabarat
coming to an examination at the University of Mosul and taking students away. The
students disappeared and were never heard from again. Dr. Hussain clarified that that
incident was in the first year, but that the protest was in the second year. An excerpt from
the conversation with her follows:
That examination was a different one. That was in the first year. The protest was in the
2nd year. It continued like this, the same scenario every year of forcing us, especially for
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those who were not with the Ba‟ath. All the time there was oppression; giving us low
marks because we were Kurdish, punishing us because we wouldn‟t join the Ba‟ath.
When I graduated in 1988 in English Literature I wanted to teach. It was my dream to be
a teacher like my father. But the Executive Ministry, the branch of Saddam‟s Ba‟ath here
in Erbil, told me that I had to sign. That I had to promise I was going to serve Saddam
and his Party otherwise I wasn‟t going to be accepted for a job. They told me, „If you
want to work, you have to pledge allegiance to the Ba'ath Party.‟
Dr. Hussain eventually got a job doing translation, but the aftermath of the Kurdish
uprising during the Gulf War was an event that would change her life forever. She said to
me “It hurts when I think about it . . . something prevents me from talking about it. It is
still inside of me . . .” I asked her if it was too deep. She said, “Yes. I still haven‟t talked
about it. I wish I could tell you everything that happened, but it is too deep . . .” But she
did continue. Nothing had prepared me for what I was about to hear. I knew that
Saddam Hussein‟s regime had brutally repressed the Kurdish uprising in March of 1991,
but what exactly did that mean? Research in the hermeneutic tradition (Herda 1999: 44)
is an interpretive personal and moral endeavor. In the fall of 2003 when I first came
across Susan Meiselas work in forensic anthropological photography on the Kurds; the
mass graves, I questioned whether I was capable of researching such a topic. Now, I
believe as Mr. Qubad Talabany does when he says, “It should be our moral obligation as
Americans to listen to the story of the Kurds and to help rectify the injustices.”
Dr. Hussain talked about visiting the prisons when they were opened during the first
three weeks of the uprising. She recalls:
During the period when we were free we went to the prisons. I saw with my own eyes an
identity card from one of the Ba'ath Party officers, those who were the guards in the
prison. His name was written, then his date of birth, and then for his profession it said
“aggressor.” It was written “al muwatedi” in Arabic. I translated it as “aggressor.”
Someone who aggresses someone else. It is a profession. It is a job. Imagine someone
who would accept a job like that…
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She continued by telling me how she and other Kurdish women were forced to return
to Erbil after Saddam had taken the city, as not to stay exposed, out in the open, because
of their children. Just before they entered the city of Erbil they were stopped. She said it
was terrible because they took all their men. Her mother and others began to cry, “Please
let them go. What are you doing? No, no, no, please…” One of the soldiers came over.
Dr. Hussain and her mother said, “Please have a little pity on us. You may also have a
family.” The soldier was a Shiite from the south. He told them, “You know, I‟ll tell you
something, I with my own hands killed my family because I was ordered to do so. Do
you think I am going to let you go?”
I was astounded to hear this story. I likened it to the Nazis and the Hitler regime. Dr.
Hussain agreed with me. She said:
I don‟t know what was going on in his head. There was something that they did to their
minds. And someone who kills his own family . . . He said, „Saddam told us that they
were traitors and that they didn‟t deserve to live, so I killed them. They had to submit to
Saddam.‟
This was particularly wounding, yet really horrifying was that Dr. Susan Hussain
witnessed, with her parents and siblings, Saddam‟s men kill her sister in their home. The
following is an excerpt from the conversation:
SH: But, of course, I lost a sister here because, during the bombing, she was killed by
one of the soldiers. She had an M.A. in Biology. She had a fiancé; she wasn‟t even
thirty years old. When I say this period, it was with the uprising when we came back;
actually, just before they left they did this damning thing. Then they left. It was the last
thing they did. We were about to say „we are free‟ but unfortunately…
JJ: They wanted to leave a scar…
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SH: They left a kind of wound inside of all of us and they did it in front of all of our
eyes…especially in our home. There is something very heavy inside me. I'd like to tell
you though. I didn‟t even cry. I was shocked…not believing actually what had happened
and her place at home and everything. Somehow we were lost. We were lost, each one
of us. As a solution my father suggested that I go abroad and study.
Dr. Susan Hussain thought her life was over. For one year she felt lost and completely
disoriented. She eventually did go abroad to study. She completed her M.A. and Ph.D.
in France and came back to teach at the University of Salahaddin. This event was
horrific, yet to “extract the exemplarity,” Dr. Hussain feels she has a “duty to tell” and a
“duty to teach” future generations so the same thing will never happen again.
Arabization and the Anfal Campaign
I first heard Mr. Qubad Talabany speak at the 18th Annual Kurdish National Congress
of North America conference in Gaithersburg, Maryland in March of 2006. About two
hundred men attended the conference, including journalist Christopher Hitchens. I was
one of approximately ten women in attendance, possibly five of whom were American.
Mr. Talabany‟s forthright statement that the Kurds must “prepare for the failed state of
Iraq” captured my attention. Following the unification of the Kurdistan Regional
Government in May of 2006, Mr. Talabany became the KRG representative in
Washington, D.C. As stated in Chapter Four, I recorded him on April 13, 2007 in his
D.C. office. I began our conversation by speaking about something I had seen on the
news a day earlier that had surprised me. An American journalist was at Baghdad
University in a classroom. They were comparing the Iraq War to the Vietnam War. She
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was saying something about whether you were Kurd, Shiite or Sunni. And I wondered if
there were any Kurds in Baghdad University classrooms. Mr. Talabany responded:
Barring a census, we will never really know, but there are over half a million Kurds
living in Baghdad. There are those who have been there forever. Some would even say
the number is closer to a million. You know, again, you can only speculate. Only when
we get a census will we realize how many Kurds actually live in Baghdad. But I am sure
there are Kurds in universities in Baghdad. I am sure of it. Whether they have the same
level of patriotism to Kurdistan is also up in the air . . .
This brought up the very important topic of the referendum in Kirkuk; the
implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution. I inquired if the census pertained
to other parts of the country. He responded:
The whole country needs a census, whether we are talking about Kirkuk or the
distribution of oil revenues. We are trying to distribute the country‟s oil revenues on a
per capita basis, but we can‟t do that unless we have a census. So the country is
desperate for a census. Because at the moment we have Kurds saying we are six to seven
million. We have Turcoman saying they are two to three million. We have Shiite saying
they have got I don‟t know how many million. If you add up what everyone is saying,
the population of Iraq is nearer fifty million rather than the thirty million that it actually
is. So let‟s get a census. Let‟s settle this once and for all and find out who is where and
what and why.
I was curious about the mass graves and whether that population would figure into a
census. I told him that I thought some of the problem, if I wasn‟t mistaken, was that
many of those people have not ever officially been considered dead. He responded by
saying that many of them were not registered. That they never received death
certificates. He said, “There are women who don‟t know where their husbands are. They
can‟t remarry; they can‟t move on; they are stuck in a horrible limbo, waiting for
someone to give them confirmation of their deceased husband.” He continued, “It is not
only a problem in terms of statistics, but it is a real social and psychological problem that
is affecting Kurdish society in many different ways.” I wondered if, legally, the Anfal
trials had any correlation to those missing persons. Also at that moment, I was grateful
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that Mr. Talabany had been born and raised in exile. That he had studied in England and
had been protected by his father and grandfather. He responded to my question about the
Anfal victims by saying:
The Anfal trials are ongoing even though Saddam has been executed. It is critical that
they continue. It is critical that the crimes Saddam committed against all the people of
Iraq, in particular the Kurds, be documented. Just because he has been executed doesn‟t
mean that we have to take our „foot off the pedal.‟ His crimes must be documented. They
need to be registered. They need to be ratified by the international community. The
international community needs to say „yes‟ genocide took place. Halabja was genocide.
The draining of the marshes in the south was genocide. It must not go down in history
that Saddam was executed for killing only a hundred and forty eight people. He killed
millions of people. Everyone reserves the right to be recognized in this way.
I was curious about what would happen if determined that it was indeed genocide. I
meant legally, beyond executing the guilty. Without even pausing he told me, “This is
about recognition of the suffering of the Kurdish people, an international recognition of
the suffering of the Kurds. This will give the international community a second chance at
condemning what happened. They mainly, by and large, with the exception of a few
noble countries, remained silent.” He continued by saying, “This will be an
acknowledgment of the atrocities we faced. We can never really heal the pain. We will
never really bring the loved ones back. But it will be closure. To say that justice was
finally served.” I told him that justice is the horizon of this dissertation; a narrative, each
person being able to talk about his or her case. He responded by saying “There needs to
be a large scale national reconciliation process if there is to be an Iraq, if Iraq is to exist
as a state.” He continued, “The Kurds are fearful, insecure and skeptical of Iraq today
because of the atrocities that befell them.”
Mr. Talabany believes that Kirkuk is a critical component of national reconciliation.
That the Kurds can‟t move on unless the injustices committed against them in Kirkuk are
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rectified. For healing to begin, he said that those Kurds who were forcibly evicted from
their homes need to be given the right to return to their homes; the right to determine
their own destiny. The Kurds feel that genocide was carried out against them and that the
world is moving on without having recognized the suffering. He stated, “The referendum
is an opportunity to rectify an injustice, which is why this process of resettlement is
critical.” He continued by saying:
We have Saddam and his henchmen in the docks for the crimes they committed against
the people of the country, for the crimes of genocide. Saddam has been executed. One
by one his henchmen are being executed for these crimes. But we are leaving their racist
handiwork intact. Few times in life do we get to reverse a crime; few times in life. And
here is an opportunity where we can rectify this. Yes, here we have an opportunity to
rectify an injustice. But for one reason or another there are people who are turning a
blind eye to this . . .
Dr. Kamal Mirawdeli (2004) in an article entitled “Truth and Reconciliation” states:
It is not the business of the Kurds to sort out the 1,500 year long conflict between the
Shias and the Sunnis. They are both Arabs and neither had any problem in participating
in Anfal as part of Saddam‟s army and security forces. They will sooner or later resolve
their differences, but Kurdistan should not be offered as a scapegoat for any Iraqi
purpose . . . Why consecrate the soil and soul of Kurdistan with Arab fascists, Ba‟athists
and Anfalists who have never believed that the Kurds deserve life and liberty?
In a September 18, 2008 Washington Post article entitled “The Kurds Vision of Iraq”
Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir responds to a September 13, 2008 Post article “Strip of Iraq on
the Verge of Exploding.” In his response he states:
The Kurdistan Regional Government and its Peshmerga forces are not seeking control of
the city of Khanaqin. More than 90% of the residents of Khanaqin are Kurdish and the
city was peaceful until Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent Iraqi military forces
there last month in an unwelcome and unnecessary provocation that sparked
demonstrations by tens of thousands of residents. This aggressive act caught the
Kurdistan regional leadership by surprise, given that it occurred around the time that the
KRG and other Iraqi parties had nearly reached agreement on a provincial election law; a
key Iraqi benchmark. Since then, the election law has stalled, and the KRG has
negotiated with Baghdad for the re-deployment of some Kurdish Peshmerga forces. The
KRG is fully committed to a peaceful, democratic, federal Iraq, but we reject such
intimidation from the prime minister. Furthermore, we are becoming alarmed at the
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increasingly threatening nationalist rhetoric that some Iraqi Arab parties have directed at
the Kurds, which brings back memories of previous Iraqi government approaches. All
concerned parties, including U.S. and U.N. negotiators, should respect the Iraqi
constitutional process. There has been political progress in Iraq, but it is fragile. The
Kurds of Iraq have made vital contributions to Iraq‟s progress and will continue to do so.
Undermining the constitution on the status of Kirkuk, one of the most contentious issues
in Iraq, will only weaken Iraq‟s delicate political compact, which Americans and Kurds
have worked hard to achieve.
The Department of Arabization
I recorded Ms. Soraya Serajeddini on June 11, 2006 in College Park, Maryland. She
talked about the arrogance of the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party in actually having a “Department of
Arabization.” She left Tehran in 1979 in the wake of the Islamic Revolution. The
Ayatollah Khomeini‟s revolution had promised autonomy to the Kurds of Iran, but that
didn‟t happen. She and her brother escaped Tehran disguised as peasants. They hid
during the day and walked at night. Soraya then traveled by mule through the mountains
to Iraqi Kurdistan where she had relatives. Eventually she made her way to Baghdad,
although she had never planned to stay in Iraq. She was Naqshbandi. The Iraqis had
made many promises to the Naqshbandi family. They had said, “If you come to Iraq, we
will not stop your children from leaving.” She told me there was a program to help
foreign students but that there was a caveat. Soraya‟s father, Mr. Abed Serajeddini, had
published many writings against the Ba‟ath Party. He had to stay and teach at the
University of Baghdad. She walked with him daily to the university. One day as they
were walking to the campus he said, “Oh my dear let‟s walk on the other side of the street
because if you walk under that building you will become an Arab.” She looked over.
They actually had a “Department of Arabization.” She said, “I was in danger of being
Arabized. That atmosphere was awful. He was depressed. He said he couldn‟t stand it
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there. That he couldn‟t teach there. That there was no way that he was staying. That he
didn‟t care by what means or what pretense or whatever. He wanted to get me out of
there.” She was finally able to leave Baghdad. She went to San Francisco as she had a
cousin there and studied at San Francisco State University.
I tried to imagine the “Department of Arabization.” I wondered, specifically, what
they would do. Soraya said the translation was closer to the “Arabized.” She said, “It
was like something out of two centuries ago; the 1800s” and that it “was amazing for us
to see that in such an obvious, arrogant, and just disgusting way you would talk about
changing people from one, not only culture, but from one race to another.” She said, “It
is still institutionalized; if you look at Syria and the situation there. In an environment
like that it is very hard, almost impossible, to teach.”
Summary
This chapter presents the narrative within the category of Memory. The data tell of
how the collective identity and memory of the Kurdish nation is scarred by wounding
events of Ba‟ath Party injustice and unfairness in schools and universities. They reveal
how the atrocities of Arabization and the Anfal campaign have left a legacy of injustice
that has not been rectified by the execution of Saddam Hussein. The data also speak of
how Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and some Iraqi Arab parties are currently
undermining the constitutional process to reverse the policy of Arabization in Kirkuk and
other disputed areas. Chapter Six presents the data within the category of Promise.
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CHAPTER VI
PROMISE
Introduction
The previous chapter of this document presents the narrative within the category of
Memory. This chapter presents the narrative of the data within the category of Promise.
It offers how broken promises of the Iraqi Ba‟ath; the unraveling of the 1970 autonomy
agreement and the violent wake of the 1991 Kurdish uprising with concomitant exile and
flees into Diaspora, have influenced the education of the Iraqi Kurd. The chapter includes
the subsections: The 1970 Peace Accord and Its Collapse; Exile and Diaspora, and The
Wake of the 1991 Kurdish Uprising. A summary concludes the chapter.
The 1970 Peace Accord and Its Collapse
I spoke with Dr. Pary Karadaghi, Director of Kurdish Human Rights Watch, in her
office in Fairfax, Virginia on April 4, 2007. Her father, Mr. Mustafa Karadaghi, was a
primary figure in the Kurdistan revolution. Our conversation began with a discussion of
language. Dr. Karadaghi had spoken Kurdish at home growing up in Sulaymania. When
the 1970 peace accord was signed and in place her father returned to his diplomatic post
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baghdad. They moved to Baghdad and she was then
required to study in Arabic. She didn‟t speak any Arabic. As a solution to the problem,
Dr. Karadaghi‟s parents asked her teacher to write their daughter‟s homework
assignments down in a notebook so they could help her at home. One day the teacher
didn‟t write the assignment down. The next day the teacher, in front of all the other
students, took a ruler and started beating Dr. Karadaghi‟s hands because her homework
was not finished. She was new to the classroom. She was being beaten and her knuckles
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were bleeding. Dr. Karadaghi was eight when this happened. I asked her how she had
coped. She responded by saying:
There were many things in my life from then on that were unfair; a lack of justice. In
Iraq corporal punishment was allowed. If you talk to professors of universities who were
teaching during the Ba'ath Party time they will tell you Ba'ath students would come in
and humiliate the professor. They would beat the professor in front of the other students.
Then the Muhabarat would drag this poor professor to prison because he had refused to
pass Ba'ath students.
Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir had told me about “donating” jewelry for Saddam‟s codicil. I
asked her about this. She said, “Oh, definitely. At one point Saddam, whose faucets
were made of gold, issued a statement that it was more „modest‟ not to have so much
gold.” She continued, “He suggested that everyone should come and contribute their gold
to the Ba'ath Party. People lined up. They were afraid if they didn‟t turn in their gold
there would be consequences. This was during the Iran–Iraq war and Saddam was
running low on hard currency.” She explained, “He needed gold to balance the Iraqi
dinar. At that time the Iraqi dinar was very strong. One Iraqi dinar was three and a half
dollars. People would give their gold, their land; the Ba'ath would confiscate anything
that was precious in Iraq.” She emphasized, “This was a government that ruled by fear.
The Ba'ath Party was so strong that even in Europe they were a threat.”
Exile and Diaspora
As previously stated, after the March 1974 Ba‟ath attempt to assassinate General
Barzani and his son Idris, full scale fighting broke out. This forced many Kurds,
especially those closely linked to Kurdish politics, into exile and Diaspora. I met with
Mr. Safeen Dizayee; Director of External Relations for the Kurdistan Democratic Party,
at the Sheraton Hotel in Erbil on January 7, 2005. He lived his early teens in Erbil.
“And” he said, “as every Kurd we had to leave Kurdistan in 1974 with the outbreak of the
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conflict. This led us to live in exile in Iran for three years, until 1977.” I wondered if he
had any story of the Ba‟ath Party somehow preventing his education before he left. He
replied, “Well, indeed.” He continued by saying, “When the Ba‟ath Party first took
power in 1963 there was a movement of ultra-nationalists; the Abd al-Salam Arif period.
That period was probably the worst for those linked to Kurdish politics.” His father was
in the Kurdish movement as a Peshmerga in the mountains. Mr. Dizayee was an infant at
the time, but what he was told by his mother and his family is that they were in constant
hiding. I wondered about those years. He said, “I spent seven out of eleven years in
hiding because from 1970 to 1974 there was the peace deal between the Kurdish
movement and the Baghdad government. But from 1963, when I was born, until 1970,
we were in hiding.” He continued by saying, “There were times when there was dialogue
between Baghdad and the Kurdish leadership, but it was only meant to have a lull in the
fighting. The regime was preparing itself to embark on a war against the Kurds again.”
When he first went to school in 1969 it was a private school in Erbil ran by Chaldean
nuns. Instruction was in Arabic and in English. Kurdish education or Kurdish language
education was official, but it was limited to certain areas. He noted, “All the topics or the
curriculum were a translation of the Arabic text. They taught Arab nationalism, Arabic
culture and history, and Islamic history. There was nothing about local Kurdish history.”
He noted, “The Kurds would like to take pride in Salahaddin Ayubi, an internationally
known figure from the Crusades, who was a Kurdish prince, but the Ba‟ath distorted it.
They taught that he was Arab and from Tikrit.”
I asked him to elaborate on the “outbreak of the conflict” in 1974. He explained, “In
1968 when the Ba„athist came to power again, they were weak. They were obliged to
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have an autonomy deal with the Kurds. On March 11, 1970 the peace deal was agreed
upon and signed between the Kurdish leadership and the Iraqi government.” He
continued, “At that time certain restrictions were lifted. Kurdish ministers were appointed
to the Iraqi cabinet, along with ambassadors and diplomats, and so on. During this four
year „honeymoon‟ you might call it, from 1970 to1974; things were looking relatively
good, quiet, and peaceful.” However, he said, “Day by day the Iraqi regime was
regaining their strength. They were after nationalization of the oil and the signing of a
friendship pact with the Soviets. They managed, during this time, to arm themselves to
the teeth.”
I wondered about education. He continued, “They also managed to undermine the
autonomy deal by cutting down on education, by implementing Arabization to certain
Kurdish areas, and by deporting thousands of Faili Kurds to Iran under the pretext that
they were of Iranian origin. There were several attempts on the life of the late Kurdish
leader Mustafa Barzani and on the life of his son Idriss Barzani.” He added, “Part of the
peace agreement was to conduct censuses in the disputed areas that had majority Kurdish
populations and thus eventually annex them to Kurdistan. In many areas education in
Kurdish was totally forbidden, even with the agreement.” He continued, “This led to a
review of the autonomy deal in March 1974. Baghdad offered far less than it had in 1970.
This was not acceptable to the Kurds. This is when the Iraqi regime went back on its
word and embarked on a major battle in the Kurdish region. Tens of thousands of
Kurdish families took refuge in Iran. The Iranian regime dispersed the Kurds all over
Iran going as far as the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

68
Dr. Pary Karadaghi had told me about the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party “master plan” to spread
the Kurds far and wide. Mr. Dizayee continued the story of the Iranian regime‟s plan by
saying, “Initially we had resided in the Kurdish part of Iran; Iranian Kurdistan. But the
Kurds of Iraq and Iran could have intermingled and thus were seen as a threat to Iranian
security. Only between five and ten Kurdish families were allowed in a single
settlement.” He stated, “The hundred thousand or so Kurds living in Iran as refugees had
to adapt to the life in Iran. Some people were accepted as refugees to the U.S., Canada,
and Europe. Around fifteen to twenty thousand went to Europe. Around five thousand
went to the United States. This was from 1975 until 1977. A few went to the U.K.”
He explained that some senior officials of the Kurdish movement, including family and
relatives of the Barzanis, were given accommodation in a place called Karaj near Tehran.
There were some two hundred families in this group, including his. His father was Iraq‟s
first ambassador to Canada in 1970. Towards the end of 1973 his father became Minister
of Public Works in Baghdad. That only lasted three months before the collapse of the
autonomy agreement. That‟s when his father had to resign and then he rejoined the
Kurdish movement. Mr. Safeen Dizayee had to adapt to a new way of life in Iran. He
attended secondary school in Farsi in Qurush. Then General Barzani became ill with lung
cancer in 1976. His father, as part of an entourage, accompanied the general to the
United States for medical treatment. It was very difficult for his family to be in Iran with
his father in the U.S. His father decided that the family should move out of Iran and go to
Europe. In September of 1977 they moved to the U.K. With the death of General
Barzani in 1979 his father joined them. He lived and was educated in the U.K. until
1991. From 1974 until 1991 he could not come back to Erbil. He couldn‟t see his
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relatives. He said, “We had a long wait until the uprising of 1991. It was in November
of 1991 when I first managed to come back. I left as a child and I came back as a grownup.” As with Mr. Qubad Talabany, I am very grateful Mr. Safeen Dizayee‟s father
protected him and moved his family to the U.K. I was deeply touched by this man‟s
kind, gentle demeanor. It was a privilege to listen to the Kurdish story so eloquently
articulated in English.
The Ba‟ath Party had a long arm and threatened Dr. Karadaghi while she was
studying in Romania. They came to her apartment and summoned her to the Iraqi
embassy. All of the Kurdish students there at the time went with her to protect her. The
consul questioned her need for protection, as Iraq was her country. They had confiscated
her passport some time before. She said, “If it were my country I would still have my
passport, but since I do not have a passport, I am not an Iraqi.” He suggested that it
would be very easy for her to get an Iraqi passport and a scholarship. The only “catch”
was frightening. He actually told her, “All I need is your father.” She refused to
cooperate and said, “As long as you do not recognize me as an Iraqi citizen, I do not
recognize your passport.” What she told me next was shocking. She related:
It‟s very tough. I knew that I had nothing to lose. This was a man who was very
powerful. He had blood on his hands. There were many, many Iraqi people in the
Diaspora who had gone into Iraqi embassies and never came out. They were found in
diplomatic pouches. Their heads had been sent back to their family members. I wasn‟t
going to be intimidated by a criminal like him. I had no sympathy for him or allegiance.
She left. That was the last time she saw an Iraqi until the Liberation of Iraq in 2003;
twenty-one years later. She was still afraid.
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Ba’ath Pan –Arabism
Iraqi scholarships were given to Palestinian, Jordanian, Yemeni, and Libyan students
studying in Romania at the time Dr. Karadaghi was there. The scholarships were $500
per month. These were all Arab countries. I wondered about this and she said, “Of
course, Saddam was into pan–Arabism.” She continued by telling me that students who
signed up to be Iraqi Ba'ath Party followers would be given scholarships and that most of
the Palestinian students were holding Iraqi scholarships in addition to their Romanian
scholarships. She said, “The Palestinian authority had negotiated many scholarships with
the Romanian authority and the Palestinians were coming to school for free.”
Ms. Soraya Serajeddini was disappointed with the Palestinian authority and Saddam‟s
pan-Arabism policies when she was a student at San Francisco State in 1981. She recalls
one day going to the cafeteria and seeing tables put together. Around thirty people,
mostly male, were sitting smoking. They were Palestinian students having a meeting.
The idea of human rights and self determination were appealing to Soraya and she
befriended them. For awhile it was working until she thought something needed to be
done on the Kurdish side. It was then that the Palestinian students told her “Oh, we have
to get approval from the PLO. We can‟t do anything that is anti-Saddam.” It was a stark
realization for her. An excerpt from our conversation follows:
SS: For me it was a realization that this is not a world wide quest for human rights and
minority rights. Basically, everyone is out for their own interests. You can be trampled
on. It was all a front and a joke about working together and that we had an alliance . . .
JJ: No altruism?
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SS: It was pretty much ethno-centric. That was one of my first lessons in San Francisco
that I will never forget.
At the beginning of this document there is a quote that says the human heart is the
first home of democracy. Many people have asked me during this research if I were a
Kurd. I am not. The Palestinian students‟ position at San Francisco State was born out
of fear. Fear of the long arm of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party.
While Dr. Karadaghi was studying in Romania officials at the Iraqi embassy asked the
Ministry of Education to send her back to Iraq. One morning at about 7a.m. two
Romanian secret service men knocked at the door of her dormitory room and then pushed
their way in. She asked them what they wanted. They replied, “We have nothing against
you. We have nothing against your family, but the Iraqi embassy wants you.” She asked
them what the embassy wanted. This was 1981. They said, “Well, there is a war going
on with Iran and they want you to go and fight. And they need medical people.” She
said, “But I haven‟t graduated yet. I know nothing. I am in school. I won‟t graduate
until 1985.” They said, “That‟s okay, you can still do something. They want you.” She
refused to go. They said, “Then we will deport you. We will put you on a plane and
send you back to Iraq.” She picked up the phone and dialed the American embassy. It
was doubtful anyone would answer given the early hour, but they left. She was scared to
death.
She went to the American embassy and talked to the consul. They said they were
sorry but they couldn‟t do anything because she was not a U.S. citizen nor were her
parents. Her parents had just applied for political asylum. She said, “In 1980 the U.S. had
a friendly relationship with Iraq. The U.S. actually denied my parents‟ political asylum
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as there was no „reasonable fear of persecution.‟ They said, „What do you mean the
Iraqis are gassing your people? What do you mean they are killing people?‟ Even though
my father had many documents, nothing could be substantiated.” She went to the United
Nations. The UNDP was an American. She spoke to him in English and he said, “Oh,
you speak English, I am dying here, nobody speaks English and where did you learn that
English?” She replied that she had gone to middle school in English in Jakarta. He asked
her to come every week and just talk. They became friends. He contacted the UNCR
(The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in Geneva. Dr. Karadaghi
applied for political asylum and protection. In six months she got an approval. She was
considered a refugee through the 1951 refugee convention. The UNDP, Mr. Acorn,
contacted the Romanian authorities. She finished her last years of school. She was a
refugee and nobody harassed her, but she didn‟t have a passport. She was stateless. In
1984 when she only had a few months left on her student visa, she went to the French
embassy and met with the consul. Mr. Acorn had contacted the French consul and in
three months she was accepted to go to France. They had written her saying they would
be happy to receive her and her family as refugees. In May of 1985 she and her family
went to the airport to board a plane to France. Mr. Acorn accompanied them. At the
airport they told her that her son was a Romanian and that she was kidnapping a
Romanian citizen. They did not want her to board the plane. There was a plane leaving
from Bucharest to Baghdad in two hours. They wanted her to return to Iraq; deliver her
into the hands of the Iraqi authorities.
The Romanians spent an hour or so looking through their books unable to find record
of Dr. Karadaghi‟s entrance into Romania; when they had seized her passport. Mr. Acorn
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was very upset and told them, “If you don‟t get her passport I am closing the mission
down and I am not giving you any more assistance. And your Danube water can go to
hell.” He took his own passport and threw it on the floor. It went sliding across the
airport. And he didn‟t pick it up. A Romanian colonel, with a very well-decorated
uniform, picked up the passport and brought it back. Mr. Acorn didn‟t even look at him.
They finally brought the 1978 register. Right there in the 1978 register, on the day Dr.
Karadaghi had entered, was her name. The colonel kept skipping the pages and Dr.
Karadaghi said, “That‟s my name.” He said, “No, that‟s not you.” She said, “Look at my
name, my passport number, and the date I entered and the time, the flight #, that‟s me.”
It took them another hour. The French captain came down. It was an Air France flight.
He said, “What‟s the problem? We‟re holding the plane.” Mr. Icorn told him, “Don‟t
leave. Because their intention is if you leave there is a flight to Baghdad and they are
going to put her on that flight.” Dr. Karadaghi said, “The Air France plane didn‟t leave.
It was supposed to leave at 9 o‟clock. The captain held it and they stayed on until 11
o‟clock. Everyone was upset. All the people on the plane were upset, but this was a
flight of freedom. The French all came out of the plane. Nobody left. They all stood
there. It took another two hours.” Finally, the Romanians let her and her family go. Mr.
Acorn held on to their hands and escorted them to the plane. He stood on the tarmac until
they left. Dr. Karadaghi lived in France from 1985 to 1989 working as a medical doctor.
I am proud that an American, Mr. Acorn, listened to Dr. Karadaghi, believed in her,
assisted her in getting her education, and facilitated her “flight of freedom.”
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The Wake of the 1991 Kurdish Uprising
I first met with Dr. Mohammad Ihsan in his office in Erbil as Minister of Human
Rights for the Kurdistan Regional Government. He had mentioned hiding in a basement
in Mosul after the quelling of the Kurdish uprising in 1991. I later recorded him at the
Sheraton hotel in Erbil on December 26, 2004. It took me several days to recover from
my conversation with him as it was an intense and emotional one. He started thinking
about politics at the age of five. He didn‟t have a single toy as a child. He was never
given a chance to be a teenager. He was the top student in his high school but he refused
to learn Arabic. He told me:
Until the university, I refused to get my education in Arabic. I was going to get all my
education in Kurdish. I was accepted as a student in The College of Law, which is the
top college of Iraq in Baghdad. There was a topic, part of the curriculum of the university
at that time, which they called “National Education.” National Education was all about
the Ba‟athists. Because of that course I dropped from the College of Law in Baghdad to
the College of Arts, English Department at the University of Mosul.
He graduated from the University of Mosul in 1988 and was appointed to a military
academy. An excerpt of the conversation follows:
MI: Upon finishing the university I was appointed to a military academy in Iraq. They
dropped me from there because I was not a member of the Ba‟ath Party.
JJ: You went to a military academy, not just the regular military, because you were
educated?
MI: Right. Because by law at that time, when you finished your university degree you
had to go to military academy. I was trained and then they dropped me and I had to go to
the regular army because I wouldn‟t join the Ba‟ath Party. I stayed one year and nine

75
months in the south of Iraq, in Basra. Before the Gulf War I was evacuated from the
army. Then, before the invasion of Kuwait, I joined the Peshmerga in the mountains.
He continued by telling me that he then found his way to Turkey as it was too harsh in
the mountains with the Peshmerga. He was a refugee in the camps of Diyarbakir and
Solopi. At the beginning of the 1991 uprising he returned to Iraqi Kurdistan and traveled
to Mosul to be part of the process there. He related a story of exceptional courage and
survival:
JJ: Was the population of Mosul mostly Kurdish at that time?
MI: It was around fifty percent.
JJ: And prior to World War I?
MI: The majority was Kurdish then. If you look at the issue of Mosul Vilayet,
immediately after the war there was an issue between the United Kingdom or the new
Iraq, and the Ottoman Empire or the new Turkey over Mosul.
JJ: Yes.
MI: The United League sent a commission to Mosul. They named that commission
Mosul Vilayet. That committee recommended that Mosul should be a part of independent
Kurdistan. Then some Shi‟a Arabs in the south started to revolt. The British decided to
forcibly join these two parts of Iraq to at least present a balance between Sunni and Shi‟a
in the country. We were victims of that policy as well. In 1991, on the first day of the
uprising I went to Mosul to get in touch with the Kurds there. Mosul was still under Iraqi
control. I stayed about 10 to 12 days building networks, meeting Kurds; Kurdish tribe
leaders, Kurdish politicians, Kurds who were in Iraq working with Iraqis. I managed to
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create something . . . but the last days were . . . one day I was informed that we had lost
Kurdistan. Iraq had managed to occupy Kurdistan again.
Iraqi forces entered Kurdistan, which ended the uprising. Dr. Ihsan and one other
were left behind in Mosul, now enemy territory. He had one of his family‟s friends there;
an old woman. She was very poor and had just one bedroom in her basement. She hid
him there. It was the only place he could be safe or get help at that time. His friends had
started to say, “We don‟t know you” and to say, “Please go away you are going to make a
problem for us. We don‟t want to be executed for you.” Dr. Ihsan stayed forty-two days
in that basement in Mosul. Finally, he decided to leave, even if it was going to cost him
his life. He was carrying $2,000 Iraqi dinar. He told me that at that time that was about
$6,000 dollars. He paid $6,000 to a boat driver to take him from one side of Saddam‟s
Lake to the other. The lake was near the Syrian border. It took two to three hours. It
was dangerous and it was at night. He then walked to the Turkish border, to Zakho,
where his family lived. It took five days. His family had been informed that he was
dead. Wherever he went people looked at his face and said, “This is a ghost coming out
of the grave.” When he finally got to his family‟s home everything was dark. They were
all wearing black because they were in mourning. They thought because he had not
appeared for forty-two days that he must be dead. He told me that at that time whenever
the Iraqis captured any Kurd over twelve years old, they killed him. His family thought
he was one of those . . .
Dr. Ihsan still wakes up at night sweating, thinking that he is in that basement in
Mosul hiding. He said his wife wonders if he will ever get over this trauma. I tried to
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imagine what it would be like to be in such grave danger and to have all your friends
disown you.
Dr.Kafia Mawloud‟s education was interrupted by the Gulf War. I spoke with her in
mid December of 2004 in her office as Dean of the Nursing College at the University of
Salahaddin in Erbil. She began her Ph.D. in Baghdad in 1990 at Saddam University;
College of Science. There were three students; herself and two Arabs. She had the highest
grades in the class. She recalls it as being a very difficult environment. She was
threatened and harassed daily and constantly pressured to join the Ba‟ath Party. They
said, “When you finish your studies, you must stay here. We will not allow you to take
your doctorate from Saddam University and serve the Kurdish nation.” She progressed
and was always the best one, but when she received her grades, as with Mr. Falah
Mustafa Bakir, they put her at the same level as the Arab students. She asked the teacher
about it one day and he said, “I don‟t want there to be a gap between you and the other
students.”
Until the night Baghdad was bombed she was in Saddam University. She had stayed
in Baghdad because she had an examination. Saddam‟s palace was near the university
and she watched the bombs bursting in the sky all night. The next day she left Baghdad
and returned to Erbil. She stayed there six months until the war ended. The day she
returned to Saddam University they told her she had an examination. The other two Arab
students were told they had the exam several days later, but she was punished for being
Kurdish. She took the exam and got a very high grade. She told me of a memory she had
from that time that in her words “will never ever leave her mind.”
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Rather than fleeing when Saddam‟s men came back to crush the revolt, Dr. Mawloud
stayed in Erbil with her mother and sister. Her mother wasn‟t able to walk well and there
was no public transportation. They went to her sister‟s home. There they couldn‟t speak.
They couldn‟t use the electricity. They couldn‟t make any noise. They didn‟t have any
food. They would have been killed if they had been found. The second day in the
morning they heard some people talking outside the door. They said that Saddam‟s
soldiers were destroying all the houses in their way.” Dr. Mawloud‟s family home was
“in their way.” They decided to go see the extent of the damage to their house. They
walked in “Saddam‟s road.” She told me, “What I saw… this was not a city. I had only
seen something like this in a film. It was unbelievable and unexpected. When they came
they killed all the Kurdish people and they were lying in the street. We were walking on
them. We were walking on dead bodies. This picture…will never, ever leave my
mind…” The conversation continued:
KM: When we reached our house we saw that the doors were open and everything was
removed, but not damaged, not damaged. My brother‟s house was damaged. All the
doors had been locked. Saddam‟s men had shot the doors open by gun. We stayed for a
few days as I mentioned before, without eating.
JJ: Stayed back in your house?
KM: No, only two or three hours we stayed at our house and then we went back to my
sister‟s. We remained there for a few days. There wasn‟t any food. There wasn‟t any
water. There was no electricity. After a few days we returned home. In addition to this
bad environment, we were hearing about our other family members; our brothers, our
uncles, our cousins. They had fled and we were hearing bad news about them. Saddam
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had bombed and destroyed them in the way. We were so sad for them. We thought that
they had all died; that all of them were dead. My mother was crying, “I will be alone, all
my sons and family were killed by Saddam‟s destruction.” My two brothers were in
Kirkuk as soldiers. When they heard about the destruction they left Kirkuk. They walked
to Mosul and then from Mosul to Erbil. When they reached Erbil and our home, they
were almost dead.
JJ: They were so exhausted, because it was so far . . .
KM: Their legs were damaged. But after one or two weeks the Peshmerga returned and
Saddam‟s soldiers left. Our government, the Kurdish government, started to function and
from that time on we have been very stable.
Summary
This chapter presents the narrative in the category of Promise. The data unfold
stories of those closely linked to Kurdish politics: being beaten in a Baghdad elementary
classroom for not speaking Arabic, being forced to study in Farsi in exile in Iran, and
being harassed, threatened, and intimidated while seeking a medical degree in Romania.
The data tell of a promising Kurdish law student dropping out of law school in Baghdad
and later being dropped from a military academy for not following Ba‟athist ideology.
And finally, the data expose a top Kurdish doctoral student being told by the Ba‟ath, “We
will not allow you to take your doctorate from Saddam University and serve the Kurdish
nation.” Dr. Mohammad Ihsan notes, “Sometimes it makes you stronger, but sometimes
you find that you have not been through normal channels in your life. We as Kurds have
been through really hard times; disasters, a lot of bearing trauma and yet, we are going
ahead with it.” Chapter Seven presents the data within the category of Imagination.
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CHAPTER VII
IMAGINATION
Introduction
The previous chapter of this dissertation presents the narrative the data depict within
the category of Promise. This chapter presents the data in the Imagination category. The
narrative tells of the influence the 2003 Liberation of Iraq, the democratic Iraqi elections,
and the subsequent Iraqi constitution have had on education policy development in
Kurdistan, Iraq. The data also speak to how the Kurds imagine the future for themselves.
The presentation includes the subsections: The 2003 Liberation of Iraq; Federalism,
Union by Choice with Iraq, and Powers Greater than the Ba‟ath Party; The Iraqi
Constitution and Utopian Education Policy. A summary concludes the chapter.
The 2003 Liberation of Iraq
I spoke with Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz in his office as Minister of Humanitarian Aid and
Cooperation for the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil on January 10, 2005 three
weeks before the January 30th elections. He was telling me how the history of the
Kurdish language had been “a very long and uphill battle within the Iraqi regime.” He
spoke about the Local Language Law, passed under the British in 1931, and implemented
only in a limited way, and about the TAL, governing Iraq at the time, recognizing
Kurdish as an official language. I asked him what he anticipated for the language part
following the transitional period. He responded by saying, “It is not just the language
part; it is my anticipation of the whole set-up.” I asked him to elaborate. He said:
If we go back a few years before the liberation you will notice that although the Kurds
had been almost totally separate from Baghdad and Saddam‟s regime for twelve or
thirteen years, nonetheless, the Kurds came forth and tried to put together an Iraqi
opposition that managed to work with the CPA, to work with America, and to finally
liberate Iraq. I think any fair-minded person would have to admit that the Kurds, probably
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more than their share, have contributed to and aided the liberation of Iraq. But at the
same time I think, this is where the problem comes, here you have one of the major
nationalities in Iraq, the Kurds, being separate from the Iraqi government. This separation
was by the decision of the Iraqi government itself. It withdrew its administration in
October 1991 and then applied an internal economic blockade on Kurdistan in addition to
the international blockade. At that time the Iraqi regime not only withdrew its support
but it became antagonistic.
According to Dr. Qazzaz, the Kurds realized after ruling themselves for thirteen years,
that even with the difficulties, including an internal war, they were able to do it. This was
very important. He said, “We like to be ruled by our own leaders. It is quite natural.
There has been a revival of the idea that we are a people, a nation. We deserve the
ultimate realization of self-determination.” He went on to say that Iraq had been
liberated in its land and its regime, but not in its mentality and that this was a terrible
awakening fro the Kurds. He said they realized that the concept of being highly
centralized, of Baghdad having to control everything, to control the Kurds, to run
everything seemed very difficult to change. He said Iraq had been liberated and Saddam
was gone, but that their were other people in Baghdad and that “The allies we had
yesterday, in terms of political groups, ethnic groups, religious groups, all of whom
composed the Iraqi opposition, today have broken-down to their true, ethnic, sectarian,
religious whatever.” He commented:
We realized that well the Kurds have to be Kurds. The Arabs have to be Arabs. The
Shiites have to be Shiites. The Sunnis are Sunnis. Now, everyone is what they are. And
you can‟t blame them. I mean the Shiites, some say they represent 60%, even if they
represent 45%, they are the biggest group in Iraq. For eight decades of the Iraqi system
of government they have been downtrodden. All their rights have been trampled on. A
Sunni Arab minority ruled throughout the entire history of the state of Iraq. This is by
any means unfair. The Shiites may think in terms of more than just a secular, democratic,
modern, egalitarian, government. They probably have something else in mind.
I asked him to talk about how the Kurds envision a federal Iraq; what federalism
means to them.
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Federalism
What exactly does federalism mean to the Kurds? According to Dr. Qazzaz, it means
guarantees. Federal, as far as the Kurds are concerned, is a Kurdistan that has its own
government. The borders should be historical and geographic and clearly delineate the
Kurdistan region. This corresponds to the original Wilayah (Vilayet) of Mosul. He said,
“In other words, certain things have not changed. The Kurds are the same Kurds who
lived in the 1920s within the confines of the Wilayah (Vilayet) of Mosul, which was a
point of contention between the British, the Turks, and the newly created Iraqi
government.” For obvious economic reasons, he said, and against the will of the Kurds,
they annexed it to the Iraqi government. He said the same thing exists today. In his
words the Kurds are saying, “For eighty years your arrangement did not work. We are
not going to wait another eighty years. We are not going to allow the Halabjas, the
Anfals and Arabization to happen here again. We want iron-clad guarantees.” The
Kurdistan federal region would be part of a larger federal Iraq, but it is not equivalent to
the United States. Dr. Qazzaz emphasized that this is where the U.S. made its mistake
and continues to do so. He said, “The U.S. sees it as Pennsylvania vs. Washington, D.C.,
but it is a very different situation.” He commented on the unifying American identity; a
characteristic absent in Iraq:
There, through time, people became Americans. They call them Spanish-Americans or
Irish-Americans, but they are Americans. In our case, this unifying Iraqi identity does
not exist, because Iraq itself, as an entity, does not exist. You cannot just create it
overnight. You see, it is just like their [the U.S.] concept of democracy. We are more
democratic in Kurdistan than any part of Iraq or even the Middle East. That is the one
thing that we have proven. But that doesn‟t mean that democracy for Iraq is going to
solve all these problems overnight. It cannot happen that way. This is where the
Americans are not willing to concede, you see. Any change, any idea, any progress in
this thing. Their federalism is flawed. Their idea of democracy, how it works, is flawed.
Not because Iraq cannot become democratic, but it will take time. You cannot do it on
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the basis of democracy today. You have to do it on the basis of something else. A
concrete system of government which is tangible, delineated, specified, institutionalized;
where the Kurds can safely co-exist in Iraq.
He concluded by saying that is why the Kurds are only going to be part of Iraq on a
voluntary basis. We talked about the Peshmerga; about the CPA wanting to disband
them.
The Peshmerga
Dr. Qazzaz said, “To us the Peshmerga is definitely not a militia and it is not an army.
It is what has protected these people. It is the one guarantee that we have against certain
things happening again.” I also talked to Mr. Safeen Dizayee about the Peshmerga. We
were talking about the security issue on the ground in Iraq at the time. He said that there
were serious efforts by some advisors to dismantle or disband the Peshmerga. The KRG
fought it very hard. The KRG said:
First of all stop calling the Peshmerga militia. They are not militia. Our understanding of
militia is something which has been formed for a specific purpose, but the people have
formed the Peshmerga. No political organizations formed them. They are a wellorganized military. By the Kurdistan Parliament‟s decree they have become a regular
force. If you want to use them in the rest of Iraq, fine. We don‟t want our sons to be
killed in the streets of Fallujah or Basra, but since they are Iraqis, they should serve all
parts of Iraq. If you don‟t want to use them, their experience, fine. They can live within
the luxury of Kurdistan and the security of Kurdistan.
Mr. Dizayee said that unfortunately the CPA did not listen. He continued by saying,
“They, the CPA, later started drafting Peshmerga into what was known as the ICDC; the
Iraqi Civil Defense Corp. It later became the ING; the Iraqi National Guard. The best
officers and the best Peshmerga were offered to these battalions by the KRG.” The
Kurdistan Regional Government also provided the Iraqi government with many ministers
including the vice president, the deputy prime minister, and the foreign minister and
others including chief of staff, head of intelligence, and director of security.
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Union by Choice with Iraq
Mr. Dizayee emphasized that the aforementioned Kurds were all risking their lives in
Baghdad. He said, “They could have been living in the luxury of Kurdistan. They all had
senior positions. But they decided to go to Baghdad, to prove that the Kurds were not
encouraging disintegration or separatism.” He continued by saying, “One thing that
should not be forgotten is that the Kurds want „union by choice with the rest of Iraq.‟
There are Arabs and Kurds. Yes, there are Turcoman, Assyrians, Chaldean, but there are
two main people; Arabs and Kurds. For us it is a union by choice with the Arabs.” He
went on to say, “Federalism is the best solution to reunite Iraq. Before the war Iraq was
already divided. You had the Kurdish region. You had two no-fly zones, so the Iraqi
regime was responsible for central Iraq and more or less that was it.” Mr. Dizayee
believes that in going to Baghdad the Kurds showed, and continue to show, their sincerity
to reunite Iraq. He concluded by saying, “We certainly believe in a united, democratic,
federal Iraq. This is our policy. But if the rest of Iraq does not believe in that, I don‟t
think the Kurds should be blamed for the disintegration of Iraq.”
Powers Greater than the Ba’ath Party
I spoke with Mr. Nijyar Shemdin, representative of the Kurdistan Regional
Government to the UN, USA, and Canada at the time, in his office in McLean, Virginia
on August 28, 2006. He graduated from Al-Hikma University, an American Jesuit
university, in Baghdad in 1964 and was telling me about an incident that happened there
before he graduated. He said:
In 1963 when the Ba‟ath first came to power there were activities and some students
wanted to join the Ba‟ath Party. The Party gave them all sorts of duties so this affected
their education. They were not showing up for classes or exams. At the end of the year
the Jesuit fathers would not pass them. The students went to the Ba‟ath people and
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complained. They said, „These Americans will not graduate us. They have given us
failing marks because we are nationalistic and we are supporting our Party.‟ So, the
government sent a letter to the administrators of Al-Hikma University asking them to
graduate these students. They did, but they wrote on their diplomas of graduation „passed
by government decree.‟
Mr. Shemdin continued by telling me that the Ba‟ath Party closed Al-Hikma
University five years after he graduated for “not teaching an ideology that coincided with
Ba‟athism.”
I mentioned to Mr. Shemdin that I was very inspired by the Kurds I had met and that
there was something special about the Kurdish spirit. I asked him what he thought it was.
He told me that a few years ago the Kurdistan Development Corporation had held a
conference in Erbil and had invited a lot of potential investors. One of them made the
following observation. He said, “We know the Kurds have gone through a lot of misery
and tragedy and yet we never, ever see it on their faces. They are so warm. They are so
hospitable. They are so nice. They are so relaxed. How do they do it?” Upon reflection
Mr. Shemdin said he thought that the Kurds are not a vengeful people. An excerpt from
our conversation follows:
JJ: That is what is different about the Kurds; different from the Arabs.
NS: The Kurds think that it is a fate that has come upon them that they will try to endure.
Then they will try to do better, to learn from the experience. If a calamity happens to
them, they will try to persevere and better themselves towards the future. Not look at the
past. That process, the whole process, makes them more mature people. That's why you
see them relaxed, hospitable, and warm. The past is the past, they will not forget it, but
they will not just dwell on it, they want to go ahead with their lives and do something
better. If you look at their poetry there is lament, but they are always looking towards a
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future, whereas if you look at Arabic songs and poetry there is a lot of lamenting period,
and blaming others.
JJ: They blame and extract punishment . . .
NS: If you look at this experience that the Kurds went through, which was really
genocide; when you pick out people for whom they are and try to eliminate them that is
genocide. I think God loves the Kurds in that they were not annihilated. There are powers
greater than the Ba'ath Party that came into action and protected the Kurds and eventually
brought Saddam to trial. So God works in mysterious ways. It is the Kurds who do not
really wish to take revenge. They just want justice to take its place. It is the Arabs who
want to have Saddam dragged in the streets.
The Iraqi Constitution
I spoke with Dr. Pary Karadaghi about the constitution and federalism. She said the
Iraqi constitution has recognized the federal Kurdish state. She went on to say:
The Kurdistan Regional Government is a legitimate entity. There is a parliament. There
is an authority. It is functioning very well. It runs its own affairs. It is negotiating
revenues and resources with the central government. It has not done anything wrong. It
has not proclaimed a country. It is what is keeping Iraq together. If the Kurds were to get
out of the union with Iraq, there would be no Iraq.
I mentioned to Dr. Karadaghi what Mr. Qubad Talabany had said at the KNCNA
conference the year before about the Kurds needing to “prepare for the failed state of
Iraq.” I wondered how she thought that would work or play out. She responded by
saying:
But the United States has to admit that it has failed. They won‟t. There has to be a
referendum. The people of Iraq have to decide what they want. The referendum in
Kirkuk is very important because it is the implementation of Article 140. And in order to
decide, I don‟t care what Baker-Hamilton said in „The Iraq Study Group Report,‟ because
they have no understanding of how Iraq works. How Iraqi people think. The Iraqi
constitution still has loopholes in it. They have to be closed. There have to be
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amendments. There are several problems with it. But, again, that‟s another thing the
people of Iraq have to decide. They have to draft amendments and laws have to be
decided on.
We talked about the new “re-Bathification” law and she said:
We have to have a truth and reconciliation. People have to know that those who were in
charge of the Ba'ath Party, who held positions of power, who have blood on their hands,
cannot, should not, be allowed to…if they take responsibility for their crimes and justice
takes its course…I am not talking about the death penalty for all of them, but maybe
some prison sentencing.
She continued by saying that this was the U.S. pushing towards bringing the Sunnis on
board. But she said, “It is not the Ba'ath people who will bring the Sunnis on board.”
She said “If you lived at that time in Iraq and you remember that you would get a knock
on the door at 12 o‟clock at night and people were taken from their homes and never seen
again. How can you forgive the person who took your family members and tortured or
killed them?” She said she could forgive people for what they did, but why allow them to
be in a position of power? What is to say that they wouldn‟t do it again?
I likened it to the Nazis. She said, “If someone was a Nazi and was one of the
generals who worked for the German occupation in France and went door to door in
Marseilles and took Jewish people and killed them. Two months later is it okay now for
this person to go and serve in the German army, no. It is hard to forgive what they
did…we can move on…but we can't forget.” Dr. Karadaghi believes it was just a
coincidence that Saddam Hussein was a Sunni. She commented, “He could have been
from anywhere. He was a criminal person, an evil person. Religion didn‟t have anything
to do with it.” She said:
It was his survival instinct that made him surround himself with his clan and give them
positions. He did not trust them either. It was not like there was this big happy family
who were all holding hands and singing Kum-bay-ya just because they were Sunnis. It
didn‟t work that way. The fact remains that he hated everyone else. He would kill
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anyone who opposed him, whether he was a Sunni, a Christian, a Shiite or a Kurd. If you
look into the Ba'ath Party history…he killed many Sunnis as well. He killed many of his
own family members; his own uncle, his own father-in-law, his own sons-in-law. It‟s not
just because he was a Sunni and all the Sunnis had this blanket umbrella of being safe
around him. If they opposed him, he would kill them. The Sunnis were in a position of
power, but not all Sunnis profited from the Ba'ath Party. There were many Sunnis who
went to jail. There were many Sunnis who were discriminated against. If you were not a
Ba'ath Party member, then you didn‟t stand a chance whether you were a Sunni or a
Shiite. If you were a Ba'ath Party member and you signed your life with blood to the
Party, you could have been a Kurd and he still would have had you in his corner. He
wouldn‟t have trusted you completely, but the fact remains that there are many, many
Sunnis who hated Saddam Hussein, who were not in favor of him, so to lump all the
Sunnis of Iraq…
I asked Dr. Karadaghi what she wanted to happen in regards to federalism and the
constitution. Characteristically she said, “It‟s up to the Kurds to decide what they want.
This is their decision.”
Utopian Education Policy
I spoke with Dr. Mohammad Sadik, President of the University of Salahaddin, in his
newly renovated office on December 26, 2004. We were talking about the story of his
education and I asked him about the situation at the university now that Iraq had been
liberated. The following is an excerpt from our conversation:
MS: I think the situation is excellent in some ways. First of all we live in a free Iraq and
a free Kurdistan. Kurdistan has been free from the Iraqi regime since 1991, but there was
always a threat that it might come back at any time.
JJ: As long as Saddam was around?
MS: Yes. The town that I mentioned, Qushtapa, was near the front lines with Saddam.
He could have gotten to the city in less than half an hour, twenty minutes, anytime he
wanted. So, although we were free, we were always frightened that he might come back.
Now, thank God, with the help of the Americans, the good friends, Saddam has gone.
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There is a lot to be done in our country. Especially in the Kurdistan region if we are
talking about education. I have a lot to say about that. Education, as you know, is free at
all levels; including the university level. Students are paid subsistence allowances. They
are paid, given accommodations, everything. That means the state; the Kurdistan
Regional Government is spending a lot on students. I don‟t agree with that.
JJ: I don‟t either.
MS: Free education is vital for the early ages, but after that, no. At the moment we have
a course of students that the Kurdistan Regional Government pays about 35 dollars a
month. As you know the salary of a worker . . .
JJ: Actually, I don‟t know.
MS: A graduate earns about 150 . . .
JJ: 150 dollars a month?
MS: No, 150,000 Iraqi dinar, which is around 100 dollars a month.
JJ: After you graduate?
MS: After you graduate and you do everything, you get that.
JJ: And the university student gets 35 dollars a month, plus housing, and . . .
MS: . . . they don‟t pay for electricity; they don‟t pay for water . . .
JJ: So it is like communism, right?
MS: Absolutely. And this is one thing that I really don‟t agree with. The KRG has been
very generous, but I would like to spend the money on other things of higher priority.
Dr. Sadik also talked about education expanding quantitatively since 1991, but not
qualitatively. He said:
The Kurdistan Regional Government has given a lot of attention to education and it has
expanded quantitatively since 1991. The Iraqi regime razed about 5,000 villages. Now,
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all of these villages have been rebuilt and all of them have schools. Even if there is just
one room, the children have a teacher and are getting an education. This is very good
quantitatively. But on the qualitative side, I don‟t think our aspirations are being met.
One area of great weakness, which Prime Minister Barzani recognizes very well, is the
curriculum, the textbooks. We still follow the system of education that has been set for
us by the Arab Ba‟ath Socialist Party. The books are still the same. The education
authorities at the Kurdistan Regional Government have cleared a lot of things away in an
attempt to rid the books of Ba‟athist ideology, but I don‟t agree with that. You cannot fit
your system into someone else‟s. We must have, Kurdistan must have, its own system of
education. The education system in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq has followed the same
program for a number of years. Recently, some changes have been made in the provision
of education, yet no significant changes have been made in the philosophy of education.
The following are ten points that Dr. Mohammad Sadik and Dr. Narin Mayiwar would
like the philosophy of Kurdish education to embody:
1. We believe that as a first step we have to identify and base the Kurdistan system of
education on the values, traditions, economy, and ideals of its people.
2. And although this system of education is based on the unique cultural identity of the
Kurds, it also seeks to promote a diverse world view. The Kurdistan region has been cut
off from the outside world for the past fifteen years. We were subjected to double
economic blockades, which kept us isolated. There were the sanctions on Iraq. We were
regarded as part of Iraq and subjected to those sanctions, but also we were subjected to
more severe sanctions from the Iraqi regime itself. They didn‟t allow anything to come
to the Kurdish area. That is why we want our education to be unique and based on
Kurdish identity, but we also do not want to be isolated. We want to learn from the
experience of good people and good systems around the world.
3. The third thing that we believe is that this education system should promote
democratic values and civic responsibility in both faculty and students.
4. The fourth thing, and this is very important, is we believe that this education system
should not promote just one religion; but it should recognize the history and contributions
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of all world religions. One of the hardest subjects in our schools is religion. Children at
the age of six, seven, eight, and nine have to memorize verses of the Koran, which is very
difficult because the Kurdish children can‟t read or write in Arabic. We believe that
students should be given the choice to study what they want to, especially in religion.
Why should we be frightened to teach them something about Buddhism, Sikhism,
Christianity, or any other religions that are around? Why should we be frightened of
that?
5. We also believe that this system of education should respect the child student. It
should strengthen the heart, mind, emotion, and body of the student, and do no harm.
There is still violence and corporal punishment in Iraq. It is not allowed officially, but it
still happens. Teachers do not respect children. They do not respect the students. A
child is a human. You can‟t terrorize children. You can‟t force them to do things. You
have to work with them to make them like school, like the teachers, like the environment;
otherwise there is no use.
6. The next thing we believe is that this education should be student-centered rather than
teacher-centered; allowing students the opportunity to explore learning as a joy rather
than as a burden. The biggest problem with the teaching methods here is that teachers go
in and talk, talk, talk. The students write it down and that is the end of the story. Students
are not the center of the activities.
7. We also believe that this education is not information memorization but the
development of critical thinking skills for inquiry-based learning. The last thing, and
probably most importantly, is that this education system demands highly qualified
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teachers and administrators trained in both subject knowledge and successful pedagogical
skills. This is the area that we are weak in.
8. We also say that this education; we are talking about the Kurdish and the Kurdistani
system of education, that this education encourages and requires teachers and
administrators to further their knowledge and skills through professional development
and higher degree acquisition.
9. We will also say that this education encourages cooperative learning and open
communication between students and teachers. The relationship between the student and
teacher is the way that I have described to you. Even at the university, the system is
authoritarian and fear-based. The teacher is the master and the students have to sit and
listen. They can‟t move.
10. The next thing we believe is that this education recognizes the diverse learning styles
of all students and seeks to meet individual learning needs. This education promotes
parental involvement in the child‟s education and the school-community relationship.
Dr. Sadik was in the process of presenting these ten points to the Prime Minister. He
said the education system in Kurdistan, in general, was much better than in the rest of
Iraq. He re-emphasized that at the horizontal level, the quantitative level; a lot of things
had been done. But Dr. Sadik‟s concern was at the vertical level; the philosophy of
education. He used a metaphor:
I always say it is like a suit, the education system in Kurdistan, which has been tailored
for someone else. You can ask me to try and wear it. You might offer to take some off
here or add a little fabric there, but it is not my suit, it is not my proper suit. It wasn‟t
designed for me. That is what I think we have to do. I think we have to design a suit, or
an education system, that properly fits the Kurdish student.
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Summary
The previous three chapters of this document present the data generated from the
central question of the inquiry “What is the story of your education in light of the rule of
the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party?” The data unfold, within the overlapping categories of Memory,
Promise, and Imagination, a story of courageous, ethical, and caring leadership in the
face of threat from the Other. They reveal a special Kurdish spirit of modesty and
humility that does not seek revenge. They open up an “always already” (Gadamer 1976)
world of Kurdistani being that “nominally submits to a central government, be it Persian,
Arab, or Turkic, retaining as much local independence as possible” (McDowall 2004).
Finally, the data discover a highly educated, articulate group of twelve leaders who in the
words of Mr. Qubad Talabany “largely on their own mettle” and in Ricoeur‟s “in the face
of threat from the Other,” are fluent in at least three languages; some five, hold
bachelor‟s, master‟s, and doctorate degrees, mostly from the West, and have returned
from exile and Diaspora to be a part of just education policy development in Kurdistan of
Iraq. Chapter Eight offers a theoretical analysis of the data.
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CHAPTER VIII
JUSTICE
The aim of all hermeneutics is to struggle against cultural distance and historical
alienation. Interpretation brings together, equalizes, renders contemporary and similar
(Ricoeur 1982: 182).
Introduction
The previous three chapters provide a presentation of the data and an initial analysis
within the categories of Memory, Promise, and Imagination. This chapter provides a
secondary analysis. What the data mean is offered in light of the Ricoeurian Theory of
Narrative Identity; the Heideggerian Concept of Being as it Relates to Care and
Solicitude; and the Habermasian Theory of Communicative Rationality. A summary
concludes the chapter.
Paul Ricoeur (in Stewart 1983: 382) states, “Hermeneutics can be defined no longer as
an inquiry into the psychological intentions which are hidden beneath the text, but rather
as the explication of being-in-the-world displayed by the text.” What is to be interpreted
in the text is a proposed world, a world “which one could inhabit and in which one could
project his ownmost possibilities.” Ricoeur (1982: 178) states, “What we make our own,
what we appropriate for ourselves is not an alien experience or a distant intention, but the
horizon of a world towards which a work directs itself.” This work directs itself towards
the horizon of justice. The proposed world of this work is a just educational institution
which the Iraqi Kurd could inhabit and in which he could “project his ownmost
possibility of being.” Paul Ricoeur‟s theory of narrative identity aims at just institutions.
Ricoeurian Theory of Narrative Identity
In Ricoeur‟s (1992:147) theory he states, “The person, understood as a character in the
story, is not an entity distinct from his or her experiences; quite the opposite.” The person
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shares the conditions of dynamic identity peculiar to the story recounted. The narrative
constructs the identity of the character, what can be called his or her narrative identity, in
constructing the story told. It is the identity of the story that is the identity of the
character. This story constructs the narrative identity of twelve Kurdish leaders.
Being-in-the-World: Memory
Ricoeur (1999: 8) believes that “collective identity is rooted in founding events which
are violent events. And that in a sense collective memory is a kind of storage of such
violent blows, wounds and scars.” In the Chapter Five data presentation, in the section
“Memories of the Iraqi Ba‟ath and Education” the narrative tells of wounds to Kurdish
identity in the form of authoritarian threat, coercion and repression. Refusal to join or
cooperate with the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party is met with the punishment of imprisonment, in the
case of Souham Mamand‟s father, with being denied legitimate academic promotion, as
in the case of Dr. Susan Hussain and Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir, and ultimately, with
disappearance, in the case of students at the University of Mosul. In the section
“Wounding Events” Dr. Susan Hussain tells of being deeply scarred by witnessing the
execution of her sister. In “Arabization and the Anfal Campaign” Mr. Qubad Talabany
tells of Kurdish suffering from the lethal blow of Anfal. He speaks of how the execution
of Saddam Hussein does not represent justice and that “The Kurds are fearful, insecure,
and skeptical of Iraq because of the atrocities that befell them.” In the section “The
Department of Arabization” Ms. Soraya Serajeddini tells of how her father was punished
for writing against the Ba‟ath Party by being forced to teach at the University of
Baghdad. In Ricoeur‟s theory of narrative identity the nature of human beings is to
embrace both a permanent aspect, sameness (idem) and a temporal aspect, selfhood (ipse)
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of identity. It is the temporal aspect of Kurdish identity as selfhood, the ipse identity
comprised of variability, discontinuity, and instability, where these “blows wounds and
scars” are embodied. Ricoeur (1999:9) believes that whereas the traumatic character of
these past humiliations brings us permanently back towards the past, the exemplary
dimension of these same events is directed towards the future, and regulated towards
justice.
The Exemplary Dimension
Ms. Souham Mamand, in the Chapter Five data presentation, refused to report on her
neighbors, even if it meant imprisonment of her father. She had the courage and integrity
not to comply with the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party. Mr. Falah Mustafa “took up the challenge”
and refused to join the Ba‟ath Party even if it meant humbly going to Erbil, to Sheik
Halawi, and “selling cucumbers and tomatoes with his degree in his pocket.” Dr. Susan
Hussain courageously entered an Iraqi prison during the 1991 Kurdish uprising to release
prisoners. She wanted to “see for herself.” Although the execution of her sister in their
own home left a permanent wound, against all odds, and with tough resilience, she
educated herself abroad and has returned to the University of Salahaddin. She feels she
has a “duty to tell” and a “duty to teach” future generations so that it never happens
again. Ms. Soraya Serajeddini‟s father would not have his daughter subjected to Ba‟ath
Party tyranny. He managed, regardless of the pretext, to get her out of Iraq. Mr. Qubad
Talabany, in our conversation, spoke of the hope and resilience of the Kurdish people in
rebuilding the Kurdistan that Saddam destroyed during the Anfal campaign through the
implementation of a “scorched earth” policy. He said:
At the end of Anfal, when Kurdistan was devastated; every village was completely
flattened. Hundreds of thousands of people disappeared; killed in mass graves.
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Chemical and biological weapons were used in more than 250 towns and villages in
separate incidents. There was no more livestock. The springs and wells were cemented
up. By 1991, Kurdistan was scorched. At the end of the Gulf War, when we rose up,
Saddam crushed us and millions were forced to flee to the borders. Every tree was cut
down for fuel to survive. So when we came down in late 1991, early 1992, Iraqi
Kurdistan was completely flattened. The hope is that we have rebuilt every village. We
have rebuilt every town. There are cities thriving with business and skyscrapers. There
is satellite TV, wireless internet, there are mobile phones; that‟s hope. To have a
government that is trying to do the best that it can, security forces that are patriotic and
dedicated to professionalism; that‟s hope. Even when we were faced with extinction, we
had hope. Sometimes you have to get to the most bottom of the barrel, before you can
stand up. That‟s what we did. We faced extinction. Out of resilience, out of
determination, out of just sheer grit and most importantly out of optimism, we rose up
and got to where we are today. We are not done. We are not sitting back smoking our
cigars and toasting our success. We are continuing to move forth. There still needs to be
work. We have to be in a position that we can never again be threatened like we were.
We can never again be sent to the borders and rely on the good will of our brothers in the
neighborhood. That‟s hope for you. There is always hope.
Ricoeur (1999:10) believes that “In a sense, all human activity is a kind of countertrend which endeavors to see that growth prevails over destruction, and that traces and
archives are preserved and kept alive.” The Kurdistani being-in the-world, the Kurdistani
identity as sameness (idem), is reflected in the values of hope and resilience, courage and
integrity, and sheer grit and determination. This character has enabled growth to prevail
over destruction and life to flourish in Iraqi Kurdistan. The aforementioned wounding
events of memory overlap as broken promises and betrayed possibilities in the research
category of Promise.
Being-in-the-World: Promise
Ricoeur (1999:13) says that “by acknowledging that the history of an event involves a
conflict of several interpretations and memories, we open up the future. And that this
retrieval-projection of history has ethical and political implications.” In the Chapter Six
data presentation the narrative retrieves the story of how the collapse of the 1970 Peace

98
Accord, a broken promise of the Iraqi Ba‟ath, forced those closely linked to Kurdish
politics into exile. It also retrieves memories of the Kurdish flee into Diaspora following
the violent repression of the 1991 uprising. It is in the historical “retrieval-projection” of
these two events, Ricoeur believes, where the utopian project of a just educational
institution may be re-animated and re-projected to realize the unfulfilled, betrayed
possibility of Kurdish autonomy and independence.
In the Chapter Six section “The 1970 Peace Accord and Its Collapse” Dr. Pary
Karadaghi relates tales of injustice in the Iraqi educational system. She tells of how she
was beaten by a teacher when she was eight years old for not speaking Arabic. She also
tells of how professors in the universities were beaten and humiliated in the classroom by
students who were Ba‟ath Party members. And that the same professors were
subsequently imprisoned by the Muhabarat for not passing Ba‟ath students. In the
subsection “Exile and Diaspora” Mr. Safeen Dizayee tells of distortion in the educational
system. The origins of the Kurdish prince Salahaddin Ayubi, an internationally known
figure from the Crusades, were distorted by the Ba‟ath. They taught that he was an Arab
and from Tikrit; Saddam Hussein‟s hometown. Both Dr. Pary Karadaghi and Mr. Safeen
Dizayee spoke of the Ba‟ath Party‟s “master plan” of disbursing and scattering the Kurds
as far and as wide as possible to weaken the Kurdish movement. Mr. Safeen Dizayee
was in exile for seventeen years. He returned in 1991. Dr. Pary Karadaghi did not return
for twenty-one years, until the 2003 Liberation of Iraq. She said, “This was a
government that ruled by fear. The Ba‟ath Party was so strong that even in Europe they
were a threat.” In Romania, Dr. Karadaghi was threatened and intimidated by a Ba‟ath
Party official in the Iraqi embassy. She had “no sympathy or allegiance for criminals like
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him.” He had blood on his hands. In the section on “Ba‟ath Pan-Arabism” Dr. Karadaghi
tells of the Iraqi government awarding scholarships to students in Romania solely based
on their identity as Arabs and their willingness to join the Ba‟ath Party. In the same
section Ms. Soraya Serajeddini tells of the disappointment she felt in the Palestinian
student organization at San Francisco State University. They couldn‟t do anything that
was “anti-Saddam.” The fear and the “long arm of the Ba‟ath Party” reached all the way
to the United States. In the section “The Wake of the 1991 Kurdish Uprising” Dr.
Mohammad Ihsan tells a story of exceptional courage and tenacity where after hiding in a
basement for forty-two days he escapes out of Mosul at night by boat and walks five days
to his home in Zakho. In the same section Dr. Kafia Mawloud tells of the injustices she
met in seeking her doctorate at Saddam University. She also tells of horrific memories of
the streets of Erbil after the crushing of the 1991 uprising. Ricoeur believes that we
connect past and future in an exchange between memory and expectation. He believes
this critical exchange is fundamental to the working through of wounding events.
The Space of Experience and the Horizon of Expectation
I wouldn‟t have been in Iraqi Kurdistan, seeking stories of the inappropriate Ba‟ath
Party education policies towards the Kurds, if not for the 2003 Liberation of Iraq.
Rheinhart Kosselek in Ricoeur (1999:13) speaks of “a permanent tension between the
space of experience and the horizon of expectation.” The retrieval of the wounding events
of memory allows for the re-animation of “the horizon of expectation;” a just educational
institution. Hannah Arendt (1992) brings together two conditions for what she calls “the
continuation of action;” forgiving and promising. To forgive is to basically be liberated
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from the burden of the past, to be untied or unbound. To promise enjoins the capacity to
be bound by one‟s own word.
Becoming-in-the-World: Imagination
In the Chapter Seven data presentation in the Imagination category under “Utopian
Education Policy” Dr. Mohammad Sadik considers a fundamental change in education
philosophy and offers a metaphor; a “suit that fits the Kurdish student.” Ricoeur‟s theory
of narrative identity is reassuring in that in the retelling of the story, the idem and ipse
identity come together in the narrative unity of one‟s life, and one may integrate with
permanence in time that which seems to be contrary . . . the repressive, violent, and
tyrannical education policies of the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party.
A Critical Hermeneutic Model of Adult Learning
Traditional models of adult learning stemming from a positivist paradigm see
learners as recipients of the knowledge controlled by the instructor. The learner is
presumed to have a deficiency or need that the instructor and the course content can
fulfill. Learning outcomes are defined and measured in terms of linear progression along
a prescribed path towards skill mastery (Mezirow 1991: 213).

In addition to

fundamentally disrespecting the learner, this model is limited in that it focuses solely on
the acquisition of knowledge and fails to recognize the ontology of learning.
Positivist Adult Learning Paradigm
Learner as recipient of knowledge controlled by the instructor
Learner presumed to have a deficiency or need that the instructor and the
course content can fulfill
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Learning outcomes defined and measured in terms of linear progression
towards skill mastery
A critical hermeneutic approach to adult learning places Being at the center of
learning, rather than knowledge or knowing. The history, traditions, identity and
meaning making capacity of the learner come to the forefront, allowing for a quite
different form of action to emerge from the learning experience. The assumption is that
when a learner reaches new understanding, he is able to appropriate a future in which his
work and identity cohere and new meaning is brought to the professional‟s role in
relationship to others.
Interpretive Adult Learning Paradigm
Being at the center of learning rather than knowing
The learner‟s history, traditions, identity and ability to make meaning come to the
forefront
A different form of action emerges from the learning experience
Assumes when learner reaches new understanding is able to appropriate future in
which work and identity cohere.
New meaning brought to the professional‟s role in relationship to others
Putting being at the center of Kurdish education, a “suit that fits the Kurdish student,”
is essential for entering Ricoeur‟s (1984: 64)“a kingdom of as if;” appropriating the
proposed future world of justice.
Heideggerian Concept of Being as it Relates to Care and Solicitude
In his theory of Care, Martin Heidegger (1962:158-159) says that there is a kind of
solicitude that does not so much “leap in for the Other” as “leap ahead of him” in his
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existential potentiality-for-being in order “to give his care back to him authentically, as
such for the first time.” In his keynote speech to the World Council for Curriculum and
Instruction at the conference “Educational Reform as an Avenue to Caring and Peace” in
San Francisco on October 13, 2005, Dr. Mohammad Sadik, President of the University of
Salahaddin, states:
Financing higher education is the responsibility of the Kurdistan Regional Government
and the education system is funded primarily from revenue earned from the sale of oil,
which is received from the central government in Baghdad. As we confront a radically
new future, which is long over due, and which I believe we well deserve, we are faced
with the challenge of radically reforming our educational system in a caring manner that
serves our peaceful interests. Our educational institutions must serve the best interests of
our communities in all their diversity and not the state, to which they remained geared.
Past excessive priority emphasis on medical and hard sciences and engineering must give
way to a balanced educational program that raises the status of and promotes
contributions of graduates from the humanities and the social sciences.
Knowledge Production
In considering Dr. Sadik‟s challenge of reforming the educational system in “a caring
manner that serves our peaceful interests” and that the system not serve “the Iraqi state, to
which it remains geared” I evoke Paul Forman (2002) in his piece “Recent Science:
Late-Modern and Post-Modern.” He states that epistemic relativism and latitudinarianism
overturned the modern philosophic enterprise in the three decades deemed late-modern.
Forman says that in post-modernism there has been no radical re-orientation in the substructure of social and economic institutions and that we live in conditions of “aggravated
modernity.” Forman (2000: 111) presents three characteristics of late-modern knowledge
production carried over into post-modernity in aggravated form: 1) the ever accelerating
overproduction of all cultural goods, including knowledge as perhaps fastest growing: 2)
the proliferation of an instrumentally defined and oriented science, inseparable and
increasingly indistinguishable from its technological correlatives (literally, techno-
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science) and 3) the fact and more particularly the increasingly general acceptance of the
fact that all knowledge production, and most especially techno-science, is bound to
particular interests. Forman says that the fact of interested and instrumental knowledge is
no new thing but what is new is the full and complete legitimacy of such knowledge. He
states:
In affirming a conception of knowledge as bound and interested, post-modernity stands in
striking opposition to both the classical and the modern conception of science as a liberal
pursuit, i.e., the free activity of unfettered minds, the results of which, freely published,
will conduce to the freedom of all mankind. Indeed, concerned as we are with notions of
knowledge, this is the most distinctive criterion demarcating postmodern from modern
science: post modernity begins where the production of bound and interested knowledge
is unequivocally accepted (2002: 122).
It is in the bound and interested production of knowledge that science has shaped and
influenced our concept and implementation of policy. Policy development and
implementation have been based on particular economic and political interests void of
moral or ethical considerations. Forman refers to our contemporary knowledge
production as interested and instrumental. The emergence of an ends-justify-the-means
instrumental rationality in all areas of social and cultural practice Forman deems “a
disfigured horizon.” The proposed world, the just horizon of education policy at the
University of Salahaddin, would consider moral and ethical implications in knowledge
production rather than be bound and interested.
The Normalization of Kirkuk
In “Democracy, Nurturance, and Community” Donna H. Kerr (1996:40-41) writes,
“Nurture has something to do with listening carefully to each others‟ stories, but how can
we even begin to listen through the noise of our own narratives, which are born in part as
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defenses against cruelties-born in part of our not having been nurtured so well ourselves.”
Kerr continues by imagining a self without social mirrors:
Imagine that you have accepted an offer of some treatment that will render you invisible
to yourself in all mirrors, though when others look in your direction they will still be able
to see you. Here I have in mind not optical mirrors; but social mirrors. That is when you
feel pain; no one will acknowledge your discomfort. When you feel ebullient, no one
will smile back. When you grieve, no one will acknowledge your loss. When you report
what you experience on reading a poem, no one will acknowledge your report, much less
your experience. Others talk only of their own experiences and the facts of matters. And
so on, surely ad nauseam. If you are confident that you will once again become visible,
and if this demonic experiment does not exceed your amusement, you may walk away
unscathed, save for the memory of an unpleasant, jolting invisibility. That is, you may
still be there. If you imagine however, that such a fate will endure until your death, your
future is most likely doomed. That with which you touch the world-your experience of
the world-is lost. Your self, your soul, is lost.”
In the Chapter Five data presentation section “Anfal and Arabization” Mr. Qubad
Talabany calls for an international recognition of the suffering of his people, a social
mirror to reflect and soothe their souls, world wide recognition of their grief and loss. He
sees the implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution, the normalization of
Kirkuk, as an opportunity to rectify the injustices of Anfal and Arabization. Kerr above
offers that caring and nurture “has something to do with carefully listening to each
others‟ stories.” In the proposed world of a just educational institution there would be a
Kurdish healing process, an institutionalized space of just memory for the retelling of the
Kurdish story. This retelling would be internationally recognized.
Education from an Ethic of Caring
Ba‟ath Party policy at the university level, in Chapter Seven under “Utopian
Education Policy,” was one of authority, fear, obedience and subordination. This legacy
lives on in the education system. Dr. Mohammad Sadik states, “The relationship between
the student and the teacher is the way that I have described to you. Even at the university
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level the system is authoritarian and fear-based. The teacher is the master and the
students have to sit and listen. They can‟t move.” Education from an ethic of caring is a
radical departure. Nel Noddings in The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative
Approach to Education in Chapter Two entitled “Caring” states that moral education
from an ethic of caring has four major components: modeling, dialogue, practice, and
confirmation. Her perspective is as follows:
Modeling is important in most schemes of moral education, but in caring it is vital. In
this framework we are not trying to teach students principles and ways of applying them
to problems through chains of mathematical reasoning. Rather, we have to show how to
care in our own relations with cared-fors.
Dialogue is the second essential of moral education. In Noddings use of the term,
dialogue is not just talk or conversation-certainly not an oral presentation or argument in
which the second party is merely allowed to ask an occasional question. Dialogue is
open-ended; that is, in a genuine dialogue, neither party knows at the outset what the
outcome or decision will be.
Practice: Attitudes and mentalities are shaped, at least in part, by experience. If we want
people to approach moral life prepared to care, we need to provide opportunities for them
to gain skills in care giving.
Confirmation is an act of affirming and encouraging the best in others. When we
confirm someone, we spot a better self and encourage its development. We can do this
only if we know the other well enough to see what he or she is trying to become. We do
not confirm people in ways we judge to be wrong. Confirmation requires attribution of
the best possible motive consonant with reality. We build it from knowledge of this
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particular other by listening carefully to what he or she tells us. Confirmation lifts us
toward our vision of a better self. Confirmation cannot be done by formula. A relation
of trust must ground it. Continuity is required. Confirmation cannot be described in terms
of strategies; it is a loving act founded on a relation of some depth. Confirmation
contrasts sharply with the standard mode of religious moral education. There we usually
find a sequence of accusation, confession, penance, and forgiveness. The initial step,
accusation, causes or sustains separation. We stand in moral judgment and separate the
other from ourselves and the moral community. In contrast, confirmation calls us to
remain in connection.
The proposed world opened up by the text, the just educational institution, is one
where education is from an ethic of caring.
Caring Leadership:
the Barzanis, the Talabanys, the Karadaghis, and the Peshmerga
When I asked Mr. Nijyar Shemdin who the most important educator had been in his
life his response was as follows:
Up to the age of going to Baghdad, of course, it was my father. My father was
instrumental in seeing to it that I got the level of education I did. If you talk about it from
the general and political, or nationalistic point of view, though, General Barzani is really
my educator. As humble as he was, as down to earth as he was, and I knew him
personally, he is my educator. He is someone who did the impossible for his people in a
very humble and a very modest way. His modesty was very powerful. Through his
struggle, his persistence, and his perseverance his name became synonymous with the
name of the Kurds. That is legendary for me. That has influenced me a lot. It is how to
continue in a persistent way to fight for your rights, and eventually, you will get them.
Mr. Qubad Talabany, son of Iraqi President Jalal Talabany and grandson of Kurdish
leader Ibrahim Ahmad, made the decision to become involved in Kurdish politics based
on a “life changing” event. He told me:
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Then something happened that really changed my life. One of the most life changing
things for me was when my grandfather passed away, the grandfather who raised me.
We took his body back to Kurdistan and the reception that he received was shocking.
Literally from the Iranian border all the way to the city of Sulaymania, hundreds of
thousands of people lined the streets; kids, grown-ups, men, women, children, all holding
his picture. Normally that would have been a three-hour drive. It took us eight hours that
day because of all the people and I thought, „What have I contributed to my homeland?‟
My grandfather was very humble. He was very down to earth. People saw that. We
didn‟t think people appreciated that during his life. But in his death we saw how much
people appreciated what he had contributed to the Kurdish cause. So I decided to go
back to Washington and give it my all.
Kurdistan has caring leaders exemplified in the historical heroes of the Kurdish
movement; the Barzanis, the Talabanys, the Karadaghis, and the Peshmerga.
Habermasian Theory of Communicative Rationality
Jurgen Habermas‟ (1984: xl) framework and foundation for a social theory is in the
form of a theory of action established through communication; communicative
competence. Habermas (1979:32) believes that a “communicatively successful speech
action requires that the participants in communication be prepared to reach an
understanding, that they raise claims to truth, truthfulness, and rightness and reciprocally
impute their satisfaction.” Habermas (1984) believes communicative rationality to be an
aspect of learning. Learning in Habermas‟ framework is associated with critique,
recognizing our mistakes, and choosing another way of thinking about or doing
something. In my conversation with Dr. Shafiq Qazzaz he speaks of a “fundamentally
wrong premise” on the part of the U.S. The following is an excerpt from our
conversation:
JJ: The U.S. is very invested in Iraq remaining a coherent whole; the territorial integrity
thing. That‟s a problem isn‟t it?
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SQ: This is exactly what the fundamentally wrong premise was on which America based
this thing. America thought . . . there are two basic reasons why Iraq, both as a state and
as a community, has not succeeded right from the beginning. First of all, Iraq was
manufactured.
JJ: Arbitrary or constructed?
SQ: Yes, they appended different parts to make this artificial entity. What was then
called Southern Kurdistan or the Wilayah (Vilayet) of Mosul was arbitrarily annexed for
economic reasons; basically oil. Right from day one, Iraq suffered two things; first, it
could not really put together a system of government that could serve the people as a
heterogeneous community. It is a mosaic of nations; you know minorities and sects and
religions. Second, it never really faced up to the Kurdish question. The Kurdish question
has remained throughout these eighty odd years as the basic problem of Iraq. This is
where that idea of centralization comes in. They [The Arabs] have never seen Iraq able to
give the Kurds what‟s due them. They have always seen it in terms of Baghdad
controlling everything. Therefore this thing has festered throughout all these years. It
has become much more complicated. It has created a whole background of mistrust, I am
afraid. We have worked together and we are working together, but frankly we don‟t trust
each other. And for the Kurds, they have absolutely no reason to trust the Arabs.
He continued by saying that it was bad enough before Saddam Hussein, but that after
Halabja, after Anfal, after Arabization there was mistrust behind the entire question of
federalism. He stated that “America made the mistake of thinking that Iraq was a
country. Iraq never became a country.” I said I didn‟t think the U.S. wanted to be guilty
of the Kurds breaking off from Iraq. He continued by saying:
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But you see it is very difficult for the Kurds. The point is that there are forces among the
Americans, the British, and everyone else, who want to, almost at their own will, create
this Iraq. This idea built on the wrong premise. The premise that these three major
groups; the Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds, can in a friendly and harmonious way, sit
down and work these things out.
I added that the Americans are ignoring history and looking at Iraq as if it were like
the United States and that the Kurds are not a minority in the region, they are
marginalized. Dr. Qazzaz concluded by saying:
We believe in the fact that we are one of the two major nationalities. We are living on
our own land. This part of Kurdistan belongs to another part that is greater. Kurdistan is
a divided country. In other words, we see ourselves equal to the Arabs in every aspect.
So, it is not working. The problem is that the Americans came with some preconceived
ideas. And they didn‟t want to change them.
Based on Habermas‟ theory, the Americans need to “recognize their mistakes and
choose another way of thinking about or doing something.” A federal, pluralistic,
democratic system is the final part of the proposed world of justice, yet it is specifically a
Kurdish creation.
Summary
Chapter Eight provides a theoretical analysis of the data. Violent and repressive
education policies in Iraqi Kurdistan are the structure that holds the narrative together.
The rule of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party (1968-2003) is the axial moment
by which the disparate events of Kurdish repression are temporally measured. The data
travel from the repression of Kurdish aspirations of independence within the Vilayet of
Mosul in the 1920s, to the non-implementation of Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution,
The Normalization of Kirkuk, by October 1, 2008. The whole data set is one of Kurdish
agents overcoming the injustices of the Iraqi educational system; a significant medium
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for interpreting social and political reality. The work directs itself towards the horizon of
justice. The proposed world of the work is a just educational institution which the Iraqi
Kurd could inhabit and in which he could “project his ownmost possibility of being.”
Chapter Nine provides a summary, findings, implications, and personal reflections.
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CHAPTER IX
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS,
AND PERSONAL REFLECTIONS
Summary
The research issue addressed in this study is the inappropriate education policies
implemented on the Kurds of Iraq during the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath
Party (1968-2003). Under the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, which combines
socialism, militarism, nationalism, and pan-Arabism, Kurdish students were threatened,
intimidated, and coerced, denied legitimate academic achievement, imprisoned, tortured,
and executed. Kurds are not Arabs. They are a distinct ethnic group with a distinct
language and culture. They embrace democratic values and continue to seek a pluralistic,
federal system within Iraq. The collapse of the March 11, 1970 Peace Accord, the wake
of the 1991 Kurdish uprising, and the Anfal campaign with its plan of Arabization, were
cycles of violence and repression in Iraqi Kurdish history. The independence of the
Kurdish Autonomous Region in 1991, the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional
Government in 1992 and its successful rule, and the 2003 Liberation of Iraq with
democratic elections and a new constitution, have encouraged hope and possibility of a
better future for the Kurds. The aim of this study is to reflect critical issues in education
policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq and to propose subsequent policy
recommendations as higher education there moves away from a centralized, Arabized,
tyrannical past, and moves closer to a federated, pluralistic, and democratic future.
The Kurds have inhabited their resource rich, mountainous homeland for more than
4,000 years. Along with the Assyrians, they are the oldest people in the region. With the
fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I Britain and France divided
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Kurdistan amongst Turkey (43% of the total area of Kurdistan), Iran (31%), Iraq (18%),
Syria (6%), and the former Soviet Union (2%). Due to inaccurate census, Kurdish
population estimates vary. Akram Jaff (2003) estimates the population of Kurds
worldwide to be 39.25 million, with 15 million residing in Turkey, 11 million in Iran, 6
million in Iraq, 1.5 million in Syria, and 5.25 million in Diaspora.
The literature in English on education in Kurdistan reveals a history carried out by
various agents with the intent of repressing the Kurdish language, Kurdish culture, and
Kurdish aspirations of independence. David McDowall (2004) states, “With the Arab
conquests the Kurds emerged from historical obscurity, rapidly confirming the longevity
of their reputation for political dissidence.” The Kurds first came into contact with the
Arab armies in 637 with the latter‟s conquest of Mesopotamia. The Kurdish tribes tried
to withstand the Muslim armies between 639 and 644, yet eventually the Kurdish chiefs
one by one submitted to the Arabs and Islam. McDowall maintains that the pattern of
nominal submission to central government, be it Persian, Arab, or subsequently Turkic,
alongside the assertion of as much local independence as possible, became an enduring
theme in Kurdish political life. Amir Hassanpour (1993) chronicles the struggle of the
Kurdish people to promote their national language and education while under the control
of hostile Ottoman, Arab, and Persian empires. Hassanpour asserts that there is an
intimate connection between state power and literacy in the process of gaining
independence for a unified nation. Hassanpour (1996) argues that only a democratic
Kurdistan could promote education that fosters nation building, self-determination and
autonomy. Yosef Gottlieb (1991) advances that entrenched underdevelopment in
Kurdistan is due to the social and spatial configuration of post-colonial states and that the
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colonies were demarcated to further the economic and strategic interests of the
metropolitan powers. Accordingly, the indigenization of colonial space in the form of the
post-colonial state perpetuates territorial incongruities between historical geo-ethnic
regions and formal borders. Gotlieb states that the historical and contemporary
relationship of the Kurds to Kurdistan exemplifies both the integrity of ethnicity and
territory and the disastrous consequences for development when this relationship is
violated. He concludes that development activity should be defined by anthropological
and ecological continuities. Gina Lennox (2001:13) offers that Kurdistan is rich in both
water and oil and because of this “neither the ruling nation states nor their international
allies want a united, independent Kurdistan, or a series of autonomous, federal states
within present borders.” Abbas Vali (2003) asserts that the concepts of sovereignty and
legitimacy entailed in democratic theory engender ethnic and national conflict,
statelessness, and opposition to the modern nation-state. And finally, Shafiq Qazzaz
(1971) emphasizes that the Kurdish issue is a chronic source of instability and tension in
Middle Eastern politics and must be dealt with and solved.
The research was carried out within the participatory critical hermeneutic tradition as
outlined in Herda (1999). In this tradition language takes the place of the perceptual
world of objects so that texts become the objects from which human existence is read.
The text (discourse fixed by writing [Ricoeur 1982: 143]) and social actions that are
recorded (Herda 1990: 51) allow us to recognize, challenge, and evaluate our worlds of
action as well as envision new, possible worlds. Paul Ricoeur‟s theories of text
interpretation, narrative identity, and threefold mimesis are foundational to the study.
Clifford Geertz‟ theory of interpretive ethnography, Martin Heidegger‟s concept of being
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as it relates to care, solicitude and language, and Jurgen Habermas‟ theory of
communicative rationality further ground the work. Ricoeur (1982: 112) describes
hermeneutics as “the explication of being-in-the world displayed by the text” and that
“the meaning of a text lies not behind the text but in front of it” (1982: 177). What is to
be interpreted in the text, according to Ricoeur (1982: 112), is a “proposed world which
one could inhabit and in which one could project his ownmost possibilities.”
The categories of the inquiry, Memory, Promise, and Imagination, derive from
Ricoeur (1999:9) in which he offers that through the mediating act of narrative we may
begin to heal humiliating, traumatic memories and look to a just future by extracting the
exemplarity of the event, rather than the factuality. The traumatic character of past
humiliations, according to Ricoeur, brings us permanently back towards the past, whereas
the exemplary dimension of the same events is directed towards the future and regulated
towards justice. Ricoeur believes it is the power of justice to be just regarding victims,
just regarding victors, and just towards new institutions by means of which we may
prevent the same events from recurring in the future. In the historical retrieval-projection
of wounding events of memory we may re-animate and re-project the broken promises
and unfulfilled, betrayed possibilities of the past. We open possibilities for the future by
what is remembered and imagined in the present. The horizon of this study is justice.
The central question of the inquiry “What is the story of your education?” was
answered in light of the rule of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba‟ath Party. Twelve
Kurdish leaders participated in the study from several organizations: the Kurdistan
Regional Government, the University of Salahaddin, Kurdish Human Rights Watch, and
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the Kurdish National Congress of North America. The one hour research conversations
were recorded in Erbil, Kurdistan, Iraq and in Washington, D.C.
In the Memory category the narrative tells of how refusal to join or cooperate with the
Iraqi Ba‟ath Party at school or university is met with the punishment of imprisonment, in
the case of Ms. Souham Mamand‟s father, with being denied legitimate academic
promotion, in the case of Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir, Dr. Susan Hussain, Dr. Kafia
Mawloud, and Ms. Souham Mamand, and ultimately with disappearance in the case of
students in an exam at the University of Mosul. The story also tells of Dr. Susan Hussain
being deeply scarred by witnessing the execution of her sister in their home and of the
Kurdish suffering from the lethal blow of Anfal. Mr. Qubad Talabany speaks of how the
execution of Saddam Hussein does not represent justice and he believes there needs to be
a large scale national reconciliation process if there is to be an Iraq, if Iraq is to exist as a
state. He emphasizes that “The Kurds are fearful, insecure, and skeptical of Iraq because
of the atrocities that befell them.” The Kurds feel genocide was carried out against them
and that the world is moving on without having recognized their suffering.
The narrative in the Promise category speaks of how betrayed possibilities of the Iraqi
Ba‟ath; the unraveling of the March 11, 1970 Peace Accord and the violent wake of the
1991 Kurdish uprising with concomitant exile and flees into Diaspora, have influenced
the education of the Iraqi Kurd. Dr. Pary Karadaghi, daughter of Kurdish leader Mustafa
Karadaghi, pursued her medical degree in Romania. She recounts the terror and fear with
which the Ba‟ath ruled even in Diaspora. She relates, “There were many, many Iraqi
people in the Diaspora who went into Iraqi embassies and never came out. They were
found in diplomatic pouches. Their heads had been sent back to their family members.”
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There was a death warrant out on Dr. Karadaghi‟s father. Her passport had been
confiscated when she entered Romania. A Ba‟ath official at the Iraqi embassy in
Bucharest suggested it would be very easy for her to get an Iraqi passport and a
scholarship. The catch was frightening. He actually told her, “All we need is your
father.” She refused to cooperate and left. She did not see an Iraqi until the 2003
Liberation, twenty-one years later. She was still afraid.
The narrative in the Imagination category considers what influence the 2003 Iraq War
has had on education policy development and how the Kurds envision the future for
themselves. Dr. Mohammad Sadik, President at the University of Salahaddin, comments
that the situation is “excellent in some ways now that Saddam is gone” yet feels there is a
lot to be done in the Kurdistan region regarding education. He asserts that there have
been quantitative achievements in the provision of education by the Kurdistan Regional
Government, yet no fundamental shift in the philosophy of education.
Findings
The data reveal a Kurdish nation deeply scarred by memories of violent and repressive
Ba‟ath Party education policies. The data also reveal a very special Kurdish spirit of
modesty and humility that does not seek revenge and caring Kurdish leadership that seeks
to radically reform the education system in a manner that serves their peaceful interests.
Dr. Mohammad Sadik, President of the University of Salahaddin, envisions a Kurdistani
education system which would:
1.

Be based on the values, traditions, history, economy, and ideals of its people.

2.

Promote a diverse world view.
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3.

Promote democratic values and civic responsibility in both faculty and
students.

4.

Recognize the history and contributions of all world religions.

5.

Respect the student and encourage open communication between students and
teachers.

6.

Encourage and require faculty professional development and higher degree
acquisition.

These recommendations were reflected in all the conversation I had on the issues
facing leadership in education policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq.
Implications
Based on my research and findings, I believe if seriously considered in light of the
development of a Kurdistani education philosophy, the following models would promote
a movement from theory into practice; the appropriation of a new way of Kurdish being.
I suggest:
1. A critical hermeneutic model of adult learning. This model places being at the center
of learning rather than knowledge or knowing. The history, traditions, identity and
meaning making capacity of the learner come to the forefront.
2. A philosophical model of education from an ethic of caring. This model establishes
caring and nurturance as the bedrock of all successful education in contrast to authority,
obedience, fear, and subordination.
3. A critical hermeneutic research model based on moral and ethical principles. This
model is in contrast to one bound and interested to particular political or economic ends
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with understanding; a fusion of horizons, as the research goal of this model (Herda 1999:
94-95).
4. A critical hermeneutic model of policy development. In this model policy is developed
through the hermeneutic circle of reflection, narrative, conversation, interpretation
(assessment), understanding and appropriation.
I also recommend further research on institutionalizing social and academic space for
the retelling of the Kurdish story.
Personal Reflections
“Understanding is not concerned with grasping a fact but with
apprehending a possibility of being (Ricoeur: 1982: 56).”
In reflecting upon what this experience has meant in my life and what I have learned, I
rejoice in recognizing the limitations of objectivity and cultural relativism. I have found
new courage and confidence in critical hermeneutic theory which has led me to risk my
own prejudices and to authentically attempt to recognize, challenge, and evaluate my
world, our world, the world. I have come to a new place in my understanding of
leadership, democratic theory, policy analysis, and justice. It is a place that I hope will be
overcome and fused with future horizons and that I will continue to authentically
question, laying open and holding open, possibilities that suspend the presumed finality
of this text and my current opinions.
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Appendix: A
University of San Francisco
Letter of Invitation and Research Questions
Date
Participant’s Name and Title
Company or Organization
Address
Dear Mr. /Ms.:
Thank you for agreeing to participate in an exploration of my dissertation topic. As we
discussed, my study examines education policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq. It is my
intention that this research will reflect critical issues and will propose subsequent policy
recommendations for the University of Salahaddin and its English language department.
Your participation in this research is contingent upon your signing a consent form, a copy
of which you will keep. By signing, you will be granting me permission to tape record
and transcribe our conversation. In this way, our conversations will provide data for the
analysis of the subject I have described. Once transcribed, I will provide you with a copy
of our conversation for your review, comments and editing. You may add to or delete
any section of the conversation at that time. Once I have received your approval of the
transcript, I will proceed with the work of analyzing our conversation. Your name and
affiliation, the data that you contribute, and the date of our conversation will not be held
confidential.
Below you will find a series of proposed questions. These questions are intended as
guidelines to direct our conversation. I would like to emphasize that I am seeking stories
that reflect your personal history and experience with the topic at hand. My hope is that
our conversation will provide an opportunity for us both to reach new understandings.
Reflecting upon your experience, please consider the following questions:
What is the story of your education?
What influence did the Iraqi Ba’ath Party have on your education?
How did Al-Anfal campaign influence your education or your family?
How did the Iran-Iraq War influence your education?
Where were you during the Kurdish Uprising of 1991?
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How did the Gulf War (1990-1991) influence your education?
If you left Kurdistan, please relate why and why you have returned.
What influence has the 2003 Iraq War had on education policy in Iraqi
Kurdistan?
What influence have the Iraqi elections on January 30, 2005 and the Iraqi
constitution of October 15, 2005 had on education policy in Iraqi
Kurdistan?
How would you imagine education policy in the Kurdistan utopia of your
dreams?

Again, thank you for your willingness to participate. I look forward to our conversation.
Most sincerely,

Ms. Jessica Jastad
Doctoral Student
University of San Francisco
School of Education
Organization and Leadership: Pacific Leadership International Emphasis
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Appendix: B
University of San Francisco
Consent to Be a Research Participant
Purpose and Background
Ms. Jessica Jastad, doctoral student in the School of Education at the University of San
Francisco, has asked me to participate in her research which examines education policy
development in Kurdistan, Iraq. This research intends to reflect critical issues in
education policy development and propose subsequent recommendations for the
University of Salahaddin and its English language department.
Procedures
I agree, as part of this study, to participant in conversations with the researcher regarding
education policy development in Kurdistan, Iraq. These conversations will reflect my
story and experience in education. I agree that Ms. Jastad may record our conversation,
which will be transcribed. A copy of the transcript will be returned to me for review,
editing, and approval prior to use in data analysis. I understand that I may withdraw from
the study at any time, that I may discontinue the conversation at any point, and request
any changes or deletions. My participation in this research project is voluntary, and any
data I contribute to this study will not be confidential. I agree that all data collected
during the research process, and my name, may be used in the dissertation and
subsequent publications.
Risks and Discomforts
I am free to decline to answer any questions or stop the conversation at any point. I may
also withdraw my participation at any time. I understand that I may request to remove
my entire transcript from the study. I also understand that I may be identified and quoted
in the dissertation and subsequent publications.
Benefits
I will receive no monetary compensation for my participation. The anticipated benefit of
this conversation to me is the opportunity for personal reflection about the topic at hand.
Alternatives
I am free to elect not to participate in this study.
Cost
There will be no cost to me in taking part in this study.
Questions
If I have any questions or comments about the study, I may contact Ms. Jessica Jastad or
her advisor, Dr. Ellen Herda, at the University of San Francisco, (415) 422-2075. Should
I not wish to address comments to either of them, I may contact the office of the
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects Monday through Friday
between 8:00 AM and 5:00 PM Pacific Standard Time by calling (415) 422-6091, or by
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writing to the IRBPHS, Department of Psychology, University of San Francisco, 2130
Fulton Street, San Francisco, California 94117-1080, USA.
Consent to Participate in Research
I have been given a copy of this consent letter to keep. I understand that my participation
in the dissertation research conducted by Ms. Jessica Jastad is voluntary. I fully
understand and agree with the above procedures and conditions.

________________________________________________________________________
Participant’s Signature
Date

________________________________________________________________________
Researcher’s Signature
Date

________________________________________________________________________
Researcher’s Name (Print)
Date

128

Appendix: C
University of San Francisco
Letter of Confirmation
Date
Participant’s Name and Title
Company or Organization
Address
Dear Mr. /Ms.:
Thank you very much for allowing me the opportunity to have a conversation with you
about your experiences and reflections on education policy development in Kurdistan,
Iraq. I am confirming our meeting on ___________________________.
Please let me know if something requires you to change our arranged date, time, or place.
With your permission, I will tape record our conversation, transcribe the tapes into a
written text, and submit it to you for your review. After you have reviewed the text, I
would like to discuss our conversation again and include any follow-up thoughts and
comments you might have. Please know that data for this research are not confidential.
The exchange of ideas in conversation is the format for participatory research. This
process encourages you to comment upon, add to, or delete portions of the transcript. In
addition, this process allows you to reflect upon our conversation. Only after you have
approved the transcript will I proceed to analyze the text of our conversation.
Again, thank you for your willingness to participate. I look forward to our conversation.
Sincerely,
Ms. Jessica Jastad
Doctoral Student
University of San Francisco
School of Education
Organization and Leadership; Pacific Leadership International Emphasis
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Appendix: D
University of San Francisco
Thank you and Follow-Up Letter
Date
Participant Name and Title
Company or Organization
Address
Dear Mr. / Ms.:
Thank you for taking the time to meet with me on___________. I appreciate your
willingness to participate in my research. I believe our conversation will be valuable to
my dissertation.
I have attached a copy of our transcribed conversation for your review and approval. The
transcript once reviewed and approved by you, will provide the basis for data analysis. As
we have discussed, data from this research are not confidential.
Please review the attached transcript and add changes or clarifying comments you deem
appropriate.
Again, thank you for your generous participation.
Sincerely,

Ms. Jessica Jastad
Doctoral Student
University of San Francisco
School of Education
Organization and Leadership: Pacific Leadership International Emphasis
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RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
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Director
Office of Foreign Relations
Kurdistan Regional Government
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Professor
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Professor
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President
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Vice President
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Former Representative to the
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